1988_2_21 (Rod Nordland | P347/p30 Book Review | Sunday 1988/2/21): DEATH CAMPS IN EVERY VILLAGE; Book: Haing Ngor: A Cambodian Odyssey. By Haing Ngor with Roger (published on 2/2/1988 [so it seems an advanced copy was reviewed]). 'During Cambodia’s exercise in autogenocide, the Khmer Rouge tried to exterminate or at least deliberately work to death a majority of the population. It did so systematically, at all levels of social organization: there wasn’t even much attempt to hide the carnage from the population at large. Every village had its little death camp off in a mango grove.'
'This was a body politic that methodically cut off its own head. The Khmer Rouge targeted for execution every educated Cambodian, anyone who spoke a foreign language, ex-soldiers and their relatives, even people who wore eyeglasses. The majority of the population - all those who had not lived under the Khmer Rouge’s control before it took power in 1975 - were classified as "new" people and reduced to the status of war slaves.' Such people could only survive by 'foraging for wild foods - but that was a capital crime. In the end, the Khmer Rouge began killing its own cadres in massive party purges. Finally it turned on its erstwhile patrons, the Vietnamese, and began unprovoked cross-border raids to slaughter defenseless villagers. Vietnam invaded in 1979 and brought the Khmer Rouge regime to an end. By then, one to three million had died, out of a population of six to seven million: a killing ratio unprecedented in any genocide of modern times.' [note that the raids into Vietnam were not the final action ('Finally it turned on...') of the KR regime, but something they had done since taking over]
'Why? What forces led the Khmer Rouge to massacre fellow Cambodians? It’s the same question that accounts for the enduring fascination with the Nazi Holocaust, but the Cambodian model probably makes even less sense. Some logical goal might at least make the savagery comprehensible, a cold-blooded means to an end. In the absence of that, wer’re left with the even more disturbing question of how human beings could do this to one another. Confronting their capacity for evil, we cannot help but wonder about our own.'
It’s such questions that Ngor ('the Cambodian physician who later won an Academy Award as best supporting actor for his debut performance in the film "The Killing Fields"'; he 'now' lives in LA, 'working as an actor and helping other refugees') tries to grapple with in his book 'of punishing introspection, both personal and national. At first glance, Dr. Ngor’s book might seem like a triply derivative project: a co-written autobiography (with the journalist Roger Warner) of a Cambodian doctor who played the role of a Cambodian journalist, Dith Pran, in a movie based on Sydney Schanberg’s 1980 article in The New York Times Magazine. Dr. Ngor wisely hid his eyeglasses early on, and spent years squinting myopically into the face of evil.' He was arrested and tortured three times, to confess being a doctor; denying, he survived. 'Few emerged from the Khmer Rouge’s death camps alive, so Dr. Ngor’s account is an important document in the so-far sketchy annals of the Cambodian holocaust.'
'It is far more than just that. Many detailed accounts of Khmer Rouge atrocities have emerged, and been greeted with varying degrees of skepticism. The early tales were simply disbelieved, until hundreds of thousands of the near-dead had staggered across the border into Thailand. Even since then, critics like Noam Chomsky have sought, with rhetorical gymnastics but little or no firsthand experience, to downplay the Cambodian horror as nothing but a war-induced famine, exaggerated by a biased Western press and wild-eyed refugees. No one could believe that who has listened to Cambodian refugees with an open mind; nor would any reader of this book.'
While the book is 'highly personal, he brings great scope to the subject. This is a thoughtful, well-educated man, reduced to slavery and suffering, who never fails to bring his intelligence to bear on the events around him. He has no apparent political axe to grind, and even gives the Khmer Rouge its due from time to time; like many Cambodians he initially had high hopes for the regime. "After the stench of the Lon Nol regime," he writes, "the communists seemed like a fresh, clean breeze."' Nordland says Ngor’s 'honesty' is 'what really gives this account its credibility'; it seems he measures honesty with the pain inflicted on the reader. 'Like all holocaust survivors, he carries the guilt of the living', and this 'permeates his memoir'. He left behind a patient in Phnom Penh; didn’t speak up when KR medics 'inject an infant with what he knows is a fatal dosage of the wrong medicine.' He can 'only stand by silenty' as his father is led to 'his death for stealing food'. 'Nothing is more haunting, though, than his own version of "Sophie’s Choice." It is a choice even more harrowing, but better left unrevealed here, because it is such a climactic moment in the book.'
Nordland says a 'lesser man would have remembered such scenes to better personal advantage, at least in public'. But Ngor faces it honestly, and 'never excuses himself'; the 'more perfect man probably would not have survived. The tormentors were implacable toward their war slaves, often quoting an aphorism of the Khmer Rouge leaders: "If he lives there is no gain . . . if he dies there is no loss."' [this quote was also given by refugee testimony in one of above articles; though it seems I didn’t write it down here]
'Many contributed to creating the Khmer Rouge, but none alone is the Dr. Frankenstein. The whole greatly exceeded in horror the sum of its parts.' Was it 'something in the Cambodian character itself', despite appearing 'gentle on the surface, yet seething beneath with what he describes as kum, a bloodthirsty yearning for vengeance?' He succumbed to kum himself when 'liberation [was] at hand', 'helping to kill an accused Khmer Rouge cadre'. '"I had not learned about pain without wanting to inflict it," Dr. Ngor says. "I had not endured torture without wanting revenge."'
'In the end, Dr. Ngor doesn’t pretend to fully understand. Perhaps some who read this book will feel they do. For most, though, the face of evil will remain as blank as the stare of a patrolling shark: the sort of expression to be seen today on the faces of the Khmer Rouge soldiers still fighting in Cambodia. We have only begun to learn about what happened there. It’s hard to imagine a better teacher than this sad and remarkable Cambodian physician, in a book that is itself an act of courage.'
1988_3_27 (F. Gonzalez-Crussi ('a pathologist at Children’s Memorial Hospital in Chicago' and 'author of "Notes of an Anatomist," among other books') | P66/p01 Book Review | Sunday 1988/3/27): THE DANGEROUS MARQUIS DE SADE Author: Donatien Alphonse Francois,
Note: The article was Adapted from the chapter "The Divine Marquis" in "On the Nature of Things Erotic" by F. Gonzalez-Crussi, to be published next month by Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich..
'My wife is neither prudish nor anti-intellectual. Nevertheless, upon reading one of the works of the Marquis de Sade, she reacted in a way that has come to be regarded as typical of the complacent bourgeois mentality: without saying a word, and having gone through about one-third of the book, she flung the slim volume into the trash can and went straight to the bookshelves to look for a substitute - the apposite word might be antidote - for her interrupted reading.' This surprised Gonzalez-Crussi, since 'Sade and his work have remained a constant and worldwide preoccupation among intellectuals for about two centuries. Theologians have been enraged and psychiatrists have been intrigued; and even political scientists have been tickled, for some have culled examples of the class struggle from the vivid descriptions of victimization that are owed to the poisonous pen of the Marquis'. He admired him simply for so 'incens[ing] his readers'. For him, successful writing is 'extend[ing] a bridge between two human hearts', and would prefer outrage (and 'thrown into the trash can') than to be 'politely relegated ... to the shelves of infinite boredom'.
She had been reading "Justine", the theme of which, '"the misfortunes of virtue" is well known'. In the story, a virtuous girl is 'made the butt of every conceivable infamy and abuse in a series of episodes painted with brilliance and imagination'; he recounts some lurid examples. 'What are we to make of this'? 'The least sophisticated reader promptly realizes that this literature cannot be read like any other. For one thing, the plot is wholly irrelevant', 'impossible', 'we come to understand why the Surrealists claimed this nightmarish, hallucinating narrator as their precursor and prophet.' 'Centuries of literary tradition had accustomed readers to consider the writer’s art as "mirror to nature." The writer holds his mirror to an external reality, and this independent world reflects itself on the polished surface. The reader gazes into it and passes a judgment on the degree of concordance between his own perception of reality and what he sees reflected in the mirror.' But Sade’s 'unreflecting contraption' 'cannot [be] call[ed] a mirror'. '[W]e are ready to dismiss it as a useless gadget when, suddenly, the surface is teeming with images: truculent, grotesque, hurtful, arresting and lively', 'shoot[ing] them up' 'like a film projector'. 'Each image is, therefore, already a digested concept, a second-order idea, a symbol.' Jutine isn’t the person depicted, but 'a symbol of Sade’s bold contention that all our noble impulses are a hoax, and cruelty the only abiding reality of the human condition.'
'The life of the Apostle of Evil [Sade] is itself a novel'. He reviews this. He marries on May 17 1763, to 'the daughter of a wealthy magistrate, a member of the petite noblesse, Renee-Pelagie de Montreuil. 'And four months after this marriage (he is 23 years old) we find him incarcerated in the prison of Vincennes. The charges: outrage to public morals, blasphemy and profanation of the image of Christ. In spite of his influential position he cannot avoid spending two weeks in prison. For the next four years he leads a dissolute life, keeping several courtesans and at one time even contriving to pass one of them off as his legally wedded wife. No major scandal, however. Then comes the famous affaire Keller.' 'On Easter Snday, April 3, 1768, at 9 o’clock in the morning', 28, stylishly dressed and 'under the shadow of a statue of Louis XIV', he sees a 'young woman who seems to be a beggar', Rose Keller, 'a German immigrant, 36 years old, the widow of a baker, struggling to eke out a living in prerevolutionary Paris, reduced to beggary.' He promises her 'one écu [Wiki: a French coin, likely gold; in English, 'the écu was often referred to as the [French] crown'] if she agrees to follow him'. She is unsure, saying she is 'an honest woman', but he reassures he just needs 'a domestic'. She eventually accepts, climbs into the Marquis’ carriage. 'And the two are off to Arcueil, a neighboring town where the nobleman has a country residence, much frequented by those who cater to his bizarre sexual preferences.'
She is brought 'upstairs to his bedroom', per their discussion of where 'her services would be most needed'. He leaves and locks the room; sometime after, he returns, and orders Rose to follow. Though afternoon, the windows are closed with 'wooden sashes', and the place is as 'dark and silent as if it were late at night'. Per Rose’s 'declaration to the police', once at the new room, he orders her to strip. She balks, he draws a knife; she yields, and he ends up tying her limbs to bed posts, and then 'torture[s]' her [is something more implied?]. After, he applies oil to her wounds, and tells her to clean bloodstains off her clothes, leaves, and locks the door. She then pries a window open, and uses bedsheets and clothing to make a rope to reach the ground. Encountering some village women, who are 'startled at her unkempt, disheveled condition and her bloody gown', she tearfully explains. They take her to 'the shed of a farmouse, where the women lift her skirts to see for themselves. That man is a monster! A demon!' They take Rose to 'the authorities for deposition', resulting in an 'order of arrest', and Sade is 'behind bars again' in June 1768, remaining there for about a year. Typically, ' a powerful and influential nobleman of Sade’s rank could and often did get away with murder in those times'. 'Historians conclude ... that powerful parties had decided to "contain" Sade’s misconduct, and members of his own family had agreed. Be that as it may, the stray sheep is strictly confined, in the merciless manner that was customary at the time.'
Little is heard from him til 1772, when he has his 'famous affaire of Marseilles', which has 'massive' 'documentation', when he is in his 'early 30’s'. He leaves his Provence homestead for Marseilles for 'some cash' 'about the middle of June'. He sends his servant to scour places of 'ill fame' for 'appropriate female bodies'; Sade wants them '"very young"'. On the morning of June 27, 'Sade and his servant enter the domicile of Mariette Borelly, a 23-year-old madam', where three young women (18-20 years old) are waiting. What happens after is 'a matter of historical record', but overall, 'great inventiveness was displayed'. ' Sade disported himself, as usual, as an enthusiastic stage manager: he directed the twosomes and threesomes into striking scenes of sodomization, homosexuality, mutual flagellation and - to break the monotony, as it were - "normal" heterosexual activity.' He, 'displayed all the gallantry and all the delicacy of manners that a man of his high station, bred in the ways of the most refined court in the world', rewards the women 'with liberality and tried to win their unreserved acceptance, having brought with him a crystal box of exquisite workmanship filled with chocolates'. He visits another 'house of ill fame' later in the evening, leaving with 'the crystal chocolate box' 'totally empty'.
In the 'official investigation that followed, it was established that' one of the woemn had sudden terrible stomach and urinary problems; vomiting and pains. Another victim, 'pale and week', was 'brought to police headquarters' the 'next day', shouldered by 'two friends' and with several residents of the Street. '[W]ith seven other witnesses', she said 'an attempt at poisoning was traceable to the chocolates that "a foreigner" had liberally distributed among the women'. Thus, the 'legal machinery is once again activated against the infamous Marquis', and he flees 'from his castle toward Italy'. The 'crown continues the legal proceedings in his absence. The two felons, Sade and Latour, are declared ''contumax et defaillants'' - contumacious ['(especially of a defendant's behavior) stubbornly or willfully disobedient to authority.'] and in contempt of court', as well as guilty of sodomy (a serious charge then), attempted poisoning, and 'outrage to the country’s morals', and 'condemned to perform an act of public atonement in front of the door of the cathedral, then to be transported to the gallows'. Not in France, however, they are touring Italy with style and honors, due to 'his high position in the social scale.' '[A]ll historians agree' on 'these highlights' of his life. 'But it is also established that the ''monster'' had no intention to kill. Behaving like the utterly irresponsible aristocrat that he was, he simply added childish touches to his grown-up misdeeds', the '"poison"' in question was 'easily available and commonly used as an aphrodisiac'. When Sade returned to France, he was put in jail, though his life spared 'through the intercession of friends'. But now things 'became the harsh, merciless repression by a society that senses a threat to its integrity in the freedom of this man'; 'Every new society constituted in France during the time of its most radical transformations found good reasons to lock him up', the Old Regime, the Republic, the Terror, the Consulate, and the Empire. Whenever free, he 'furiously attacked all conventions', while increasingly his body immobilized ('which he bitterly complained about toward the end of his life') and became 'ponderously fat'.
Then came Bonaparte. 'The Great Corsican’s legions are razing the old monarchies and spreading the light of freedom; a new dawn shines. In a fit of enthusiasm for the new order, Sade sends the Emperor an autographed copy of his most recent work. New disappointment. Outraged at the boldness of the descriptions, the undisguised sexual frenzies and the disregard of all moral precepts, the Emperor orders Sade interned in an asylum for the insane.' Even today, the author concedes, we would 'find, no doubt, valid reasons to put him behind bars. And I do not mean his sexual deviancy', to which we 'have grown tolerant' and even 'more enlightened', even (mostly) regarding '[s]exual sadism and ... masochism'. He notes that 'we like to think' of the 18th century as 'the Age of Reason'; and Sade’s pages are full of such 'truly noble paragraphs of 18th-century prose ... arrayed in support of his argumentation [to convince people to do ill]'. His writings’ victims, such as Justine, try to 'invoke the terrible pains of remorse to dissuade evildoers'. But they reply, more or less, to '[g]et used to evil, and remorse will vanish'; if you feel bad for one crime, do many more.
He considers if we could 'bring back some of Sade’s contemporaries', such as Rousseau, who would 'still thrill us', though he doubts 'that anyone would take him seriously as the political scientist, sociologist and philosopher that he fancied he was'. Or Diderot, '"the father of witty conversation"', 'might make it big on the lecture circuit, but academicians would spurn him for losing time in trifles'. 'Dr. Johnson would have some following, but I am afraid he would not reach a mass audience. Television would be out of the question for the good doctor,' crowded out by romance, sex, drugs, and 'shoulder-shrugging'. 'Voltaire, of course, could do anything. He would thrill us and instruct us and amuse us. The problem is, overly preoccupied with the church, he would continue thundering about irrationality in Christian doctrine, and critics would ask why such a genius insists on wasting his talents on topics that are no longer "relevant."'
'Sade alone would terrify. For Sade alone would stand apart from all these great men, and in the isolation of his cell (for, surely, we would imprison him) would continue distilling the nihilistic tenets of a philosophy whose central tenet simply says Le prochain ne m’est rien - the brotherhood of man means nothing to me. "Man is alone in the world. All creatures are born in isolation, and without any need for each other," he insisted. The only possible relationship Sade admits is that of crime, or of carnal concupiscence.' Though today, '[t]wo centuries after Sade', we affirm to ourselves there is a 'larger plan that integrates all people into the universal community and rules, or ought to rule, their behavior'. But 'we have behaved as if such a link did not really exist'. 'We have stood indifferent to genocide in Germany, while it occurred, and to mass extermination in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, to name only a few recent hecatombs. It is worthy of note that while the carnage was going on, we felt, in all candor, quite at ease. The record will show that the entire world looked on with utter indifference at horrifying deeds and that millions in Vancouver, Beijing or Australia lose no sleep over thousands upon thousands of killings in Central America. Everyone knows it. For, tell me, how could one live if one were deeply troubled by these things? ("Don’t you see, Justine? Men are not disturbed for doing what they do by habit.") In other words, millions of men die unjustly, at the hands of other men, all the time. And our response to this is: "I know it, and that is quite sufficient. Enough said; spare me the gory details." But suppose someone were rash enough to persist. Assume a man were to be found who kept describing, denoting, copying, with lifelong, obsessive insistence, all the details and horrors of all crimes. Woe to him! An entire society, bristling with indignation, would crush this hideous violator of its accepted standards.'
'Who knows, if the pestilent descriptions were to fall into unprepared hands - why, the young might be induced to raping, or thieving, or killing! Worded differently, all the outrage that slumbered during the actual performance of wholesale atrocity is suddenly awake, and ready to punish the man who, by being too spirited and imaginative a portraitist, might misguide the incautious. Would we not punish such a man, just as his countrymen did? It would feel so good to avenge a single rape after having stood indifferent to the sacrifice of millions!' 'Sade, of course, went too far. Not only did he dare to shake the complacency of society, but he made of it a profession of faith. Not only was he the denotator of crime in its infinite morphologies, but he built a system with his denotations. He dared to maintain that the fundamental relationship between human beings is not one subordinate to a higher, supra-individual value, but purely and simply this one: violence and cruelty. "The merit of Sade," wrote Simone de Beauvoir, "is not only to have cried loudly what all confess shamefully to themselves: it is to have taken sides. Instead of indifference, he chose cruelty. And this is why he finds so many echoes today, when the individual is aware of being the victim not so much of the malice of men as of their good conscience."'
1988_5_23 (Larry Pressler | P19/p02 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Monday 1988/5/23): We Can’t Isolate Vietnam Forever. 'Following a visit to Vietnam last month, I concluded that more than 13 years after the last American helicopters left Saigon, the United States should consider ending its isolation of Vietnam. For the first time, Congress seems ready to review American policy there. United States policy has remained virtually unchanged since April 30, 1975, when we closed our embassy and evacuated the last American personnel. Since then we have sought to keep Vietnam diplomatically isolated while denying aid and imposing a trade embargo. In 1978, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, we escalated our policy to oppose diplomatic recognition until Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia and until it fully cooperated in resolving cases of Americans missing in action.' But could these objectives be easier achieved via 'regular official contacts', 'and if it made known its readiness to respond to urgent humanitarian needs through such established programs as Food for Peace'? In the 'Moscow summit meeting next week', the White House should include Vietnam/Cambodia on 'the agenda'. It would 'benefit from the kind of "realistic engagement" by the US that, he argues, helped to reach agreement on Soviet withdrawl from Afghanistan. Currently, 'we are leaving the Soviet Union a clear field in Vietnam'; on his visit, he saw 'Soviet personnel in many places', 'staying at and using facilities previously used by the United States, most importantly the former United States naval base and the harbor at Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet economic and military assistance to Vietnam, one of the poorest countries in the world, is estimated at some $1.6 billion annually. Nonetheless, the Vietnamese are disatisfied with Soviet involvement in their country.'
As it is, the Vietnamese have 'only one option'; the US should instead 'actively seek a dialogue' to work out their withdrawl from Cambodia, with Afghanistan as a model, 'and our role as a guarantor', exemplifying how the US can contribute to such. The US policy to Vietnam intends to isolate it; but this also isolates us from 'a country in which we have a lasting interest.' Pressler 'served as an Army lieutenant in Vietnam in 1967 and 1968'. 'Since my return visit', he heard from other vets eager to 'renew their ties to that country', some looking for children fathered there 'with Vietnamese mothers, others for friends', 'many of whom were locked up for years in harsh "re-education camps"', most of such prisoners though 'have been released, but they are not yet free to leave Vietnam for reunion with family and friends' in the US. Others are concerned about the MIA 'issue', and want a 'first-hand look' to 'help resolve lingering questions'. Other vets simply said they 'want to go back to see where they served'. 'All this demonstrates the almost forgotten bond the United States has with Vietnam. Nearly three million Americans served there during our 15 year involvement. In the years since the war, close to a million Vietnamese and their families have come to the United States'. A Vietnamese-American accompanied Pressler on his journey, reuniting with his 'aging mother in Hanoi' and 'other relatives in Ho Chi Minh City', a powerful sight that showed 'the powerful attraction that family ties have for the Vietnamese, as they do for us.'
The 'Vietnamese appear ready to welcome Americans', for many reasons. One Vietnamese Pressler spoke to said 'his country has been "occupied" in this century, as he put it, by the French, the Japanese, the Americans and the Russians. "And the Americans are the ones we want back," he said. Probably the Americans’ reputation for generosity to former enemies is part of the reason, but I believe it goes deeper. I sensed an enduring interest in American life and culture and economic techniques among many of the Vietnamese with whom we met.'
The US couldn’t have played its 'active role' vis-a-vis the Afghanistan agreement, without 'engaging in continuing dialogue' with the USSR. 'Likewise in Indochina', the US, China, and 'our allies in the' ASEAN 'have a vital role to play in bring about a settlement in Cambodia and in guaranteeing its security against encroachments by the genocidal Khmer Rouge. It is not enough to preach about withdrawal to the Vietnamese. We need to shoulder some share of responsibility in a region where the United States presence just 15 years ago was a central factor. Our policy of isolation has reached the point of diminishing returns. The Moscow summit meeting would be a good opportunity for America to begin a new approach toward Vietnam.'
1988_8_14 (James Markham | P01/The Week in Review | Sunday 1988/8/14): Some Paths Are No Longer Blocked; Battle Fatigue: Some Wars Are Failing the Cost-Benefits Test. He opens by observing the Iran-Iraq 'sputtering last week to a stalemated conclusion', and reflecting on the 'carnage [that] left perhaps one million dead', transforming the Iraqi military into a 'battle-hardened machine' that used chemical warfare on a 'scale not witnessed since' WWI. It ended more for exhaustion of both sides; 'the Iranian revolution is showing the first symptoms of ideological fatique'. He argues '[i]f peace seemed to be spreading around the globe last week, it was in part because the United States and the Soviet Union have resolved to put a higher priority on their bilateral ties than on seeking marginal advantages in third world conflicts'. Gorbachev wants to prioritize 'economic revival at home' over foreign wars, such as Afghanistan, and 'last week initiated its withdrawal from Kabul, which is now increasingly prey to bombardment by the Afghan guerrillas'. It also seems likely Vietnam will soon withdraw from Cambodia, permitting Sihanouk’s return. 'The Vietnamese, like the Russians, have learned that occupation is expensive, particularly since their own paymasters in Moscow have become reluctant to foot the bill'. Similar considerations affect Angola, where not only is the USSR rethinking, but so is South Africa - the latter especially with respect to Namibia.
The UN is also gaining legitimation amidst this '[w]ar fatigue', 'which had long been treated with aloofness by Moscow and with contempt by American conservatives.'. Gorbachev is now paying $159m in arrears for its peacekeeping contribution, and the US ('which owes about $467 million in back dues and $70 million for existing peacekeeping activities') 'would come up with the $15 million or so that it expects to be asked to pay for monitoring the ceasefire in the gulf'. Where the will for UN peacekeeping is lacking (perhaps he suspects, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Central America), 'conflicts rage or simmer'.
He worries about conflict in the wake of Soviet withdrawl from Afghanistan. Regarding Indochina: 'And, while ending a foreign occupation is a laudable goal, it is sometimes forgotten that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 halted the genocidal reign of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, who may have killed two million of their own people. The Khmer Rouge are the strongest of the anti-Vietnamese resistance groups - and hardly enthusiasts for the free elections that Prince Sihanouk would like to see take place after a Vietnamese withdrawal.' Overall, Markham doesn’t see a peaceful world on the horizon.
1988_10_08 (Editorial staff | P26/p01 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Saturday 1988/10/8): Never Again the Khmer Rouge. 'Cambodia’s paramount problem long seemed to be Vietnamese occupation. Now, with Vietnam seemingly ready to leave, the focus shifts to what might rush into the vacuum: the same fanatical Khmer Rouge that, under Pol Pot, terrorized Cambodia from 1975 until Vietnam’s 1978 invasion. Washington has rightly moved to bolster moderate factions, while Moscow and Beijing, patrons of Cambodia’s two tormentors, have begun to back off their opposing stands. Hard work remains, but the sense of possibility is unmistakable.' Vietnam says 50k soldiers will be out by year’s end, and the remaining 70k by 1990. THe promise is 'more credible now' since Moscow is less keen on funding it, and thus, the PRC is 'willing to move toward the summitry that Moscow has sought'. The author fears the main consequence of withdrawal though will be a 'Khmer Rouge coup'; they have 40k troops, far more than the 'two non-Communist factions' in its alliance; this alliance is supposed to rule in coalition with the 'Vietnamese-installed Government'.
'China’s evolving change in position needs encouragement. But merely containing the Khmer Rouge in this way will hardly do. Pol Pot and his beastly henchmen have never been called to account for the terrors they visited on Cambodia. Indeed, along with their coalition partners, they continue to represent Cambodia in the U.N.' Now even Sihanouk says 'an empty U.N. seat' is better than one that includes the KR, 'which he accuses of attacking his own troops'. 'This year 12 Nobel laureates called for unseating the coalition, a call that deserves support in the upcoming U.N. debate. And the U.S. could go further. It could invoke the U.N. convention on genocide and ask the World Court to determine the truth about this dark period.' 'Meanwhile, Congress appears likely to endorse President Reagan’s request for increased aid to the Khmer Rouge’s two coalition partners. That’s as it should be. The first responsibility now for those who have backed the resistance is to save Cambodia from another round of the Khmer Rouge.'
1988_10_21 (Clifford D. Conner, in New York City, New York | P22/p01 Letters to the Editor | Tuesday 1988/11/8): Vietnam Rescued Cambodians From Genocide. 'Of all the illogic in present-day public discourse, the most stunning example concerns the Vietnamese role in Cambodia. In "New Killing Fields?" (Op-Ed, Oct. 17), Lionel A. Rosenblatt reminds us of the horrors the Khmer Rouge inflicted upon the Cambodian people and warns us of the real danger of that murderous gang’s return (with or without Pol Pot). But he adds, as a virtually self-evident proposition that this "does not mean we should ease pressure on the Vietnamese to end their occupation of Cambodia."'
'The constant unexamined assumption is that somehow the Vietnamese are co-villains in the Cambodian tragedy; that their presence in that country should be deplored. Yet it was the Vietnamese - and they alone - who drove Pol Pot’s regime out of Cambodia and put an end to genocide.'
'Furthermore, Vietnamese troops have been the only effective obstacle to the Khmer Rouge’s return. Meanwhile, our Government consistently pushed in the opposite direction, demanding that the Vietnamese withdraw and paying for the coalition in which the Khmer Rouge is the dominant partner. Fortunately for Cambodians, the Vietnamese have stood their ground and not allowed the killing fields to reappear.'
'The Vietnamese should be remembered as the liberators of Cambodia. They ought to be applauded, and not assailed, for the job that they have done.'
1988_12_19 (Steven Erlanger in Samach, Cambodia | P03/A03 | Tuesday 1988/12/20): Hanoi Steps Up Its Cambodia Pullout. Vietnam and the pro-Vietnam Hun Sen govt of Cambodia went to great lengths inviting ~200 press members to witness the withdrawl of 18k troops at this [Samach] 'border post today'. 'In separate celebrations and speeches here and in Kompong Cham city, the provincial capital, Cambodian officials expressed gratitude to Vietnamese commanders for liberating the Cambodian people from what is invariably called "the genocidal regime" of the Khmer Rouge.' '"We will always keep in our heart the noble sacrifice of our comrades and their families for the Cambodian revolution," Mr. Hun Neng ['party secretary of Kompong Cham Province' and 'elder brother of Mr. Hun Sen'] said. "You helped us to gain freedom and real happiness."'
During the 1980s, 'Vietnam has been largely isolated by countries outside the Soviet bloc for its 1978 invasion. An American-led embargo on aid to and trade with Hanoi, though somewhat porous, has hurt, and economic difficulties at home apparently countributed to Hanoi’s decision to withdraw entirely by the first quarter of 1990.' After this week, Vietnam says 50k troops will remain (down from 200k), tho the West thinks really 70k-85k will remain. The Hun Sen govt has also struggled 'securing international recognition', despite stressing his qualities against the prior KR govt. 'The diplomatic challenge is to structure an interim government that would include the Khmer Rouge, the followers of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and those of former Prime Minister Son Sann, all of whom have fought against Mr. Hun Sen, without allowing the Khmer Rouge to return to power.'
One Lieutenant Coloenl, Van Tien Hong, had been in Cambodia twice, both for three years: during the American war, and after the 1978 invasion, though expected to return only '"as a tourist"'. 'He said the Khmer Rouge guerrillas are good fighters and are well-equipped with mostly Chinese weaponry. "But the Vietnamese soldier will fight better than the Khmer Rouge," he said. "We’re better at basics."' There is 'nervousness' about how Hun Sen’s soldiers will hold up though, who 'Western diplomats' estimate has 44k troops; Hun Sen said 'last week at a news conference' he will rely 'heavily on militia to hold off' the KR. 'There are reports that the Khmer Rouge blew up the railroad line from Battambang in the northwest to Phnom Penh four days ago. The reports could not be confirmed.'
1989_1_29 (Richard J. Evans (he 'is the author of "Death in Hamburg" and the forthcoming "Out of the Shadow of Hitler: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape From the Nazi Past."') | P89/p28 Book Review | Sunday 1989/1/29): A 'NORMAL' ACT OF GENOCIDE?; Book: THE UNMASTERABLE PAST History, Holocaust, and German National Identity. By Charles S. Maier (published on 9/11/1988). He opens with a discussion of what we call the Historikerstreit, a debate between right- and left-wing West German historians about Hitler. The right-wingers want to 'stop feeling guilty', and 'recognize the part played by Hitler’s armies on the Eastern Front in defending Western civilization against Stalinist Communism', some even arguing that the invasion was 'preventative'. The central such figure is Ernst Nolte. He has claimed that the 'mass murder of millions of Jews by the Nazis at Auschwitz and elsewhere was not a unique event', instead a '"normal" 20th-century act of genocide, comparable to Pol Pot’s' or the 'massacre of Armenians by the Turks in 1915'. He has also 'claimed that Nazi extermination was a reaction to the international Communist threat to wipe out the German -and the European - bourgeoisie. Auschwitz, in his view, was both a copy of Stalin’s Gulag Archipelago and a pre-emptive defense against the perceived Communist threat to Central Europe. The implication is that Germans need feel no exceptional guilt about the Nazi past.'
These have been widely criticized/condemned, in 'West Germany and internationally'. Apparently the reviewed book is the 'first book-length contribution to the debate to appear in English', arguing against Nolte et al. He 'demonstrates how flimsy is the evidence on which their views rest'. The Nazi invasion of the USSR wasn’t preventative, but ideologically barbaric, and 'fighting for Hitler, not for Western Civilization'. '[H]is most effective passages' argue against 'Nolte’s attempt to deny the uniqueness of Auschwitz.' He convincingly argues he isn’t making proper 'historical comparison' ('weighing what was similar, in order to isolate what was different'), but is more 'concerned to obscure the differences'. 'Stalin’s terror was arbitrary; Nazism’s was not. Unlike a German or European Jew, "no Soviet citizen had to expect that deportation or death must be so inevitable by virtue of ethnic origins"'. '"Nowhere else but in German-occupied Europe from 1941 to 1945 was there an apparatus so single-mindedly established to carry out mass murder as a process in its own right." The Nazis did not borrow these methods from the Russians. Nor, in this sense, was there any international Communist threat to "exterminate" the European bourgeoisie. There was no Soviet Treblinka, built to murder on arrival. It was its determination to achieve the total extinction of a whole people without exception that made Nazism unique.'
While countering the 'German neoconservatives', 'the main effort' is to 'situat[e] their views, and those of their opponents, notably the social theorist Jurgen Habermas, in their intellectual context. Mr. Maier does this very well'. He draws attention to the 'relation of the debate to the emergence of post-modernist historiography', which Evans finds insightful. Though he finds 'this procedure lifts the debate out of the actual, concrete questions of the historical fact and interpretation on which so much of it centers'. He thinks that Maier gives the debate too much 'intellectual dignity' than it 'deserve[s]'; rather, it’s 'really about a crude and intellectually none-too-coherent attempt at exculpation'. For example, in Nolte’s "The European Civil War", he 'hints' the Holocaust 'was justified'; that deniers 'deserve to be taken seriously'; this doesn’t deserve to be elevated.
He also thinks Maier used too much a 'high mandarin style of writing', too ivory-tower, multi-lingual, read-in-philosophy (while spelling some German wrong, and 'getting his Latin grammar wrong in one instance'). While these are 'minor blemishes', 'they make the reader wonder whether Mr. Maier is right to present the debate in such highly academic terms. In reality something elementary is at stake, namely the truth. Most present-day Germans should not feel directly guilty for the crimes of Nazism. But all present-day Germans bear a heavy historical responsibility for them. Only by accepting this openly and engaging in an honest confrontation with the past can they hope to build a true sense of national dignity in the future.'
TIME: 1989_2_06 (Strobe Talbott | P40/p03 World | Monday 1989/2/6): America Abroad: Defanging the Beast. 'The consequences of U.S. intervention in Kampuchea have made a mockery of American intentions before, and they could do so again'. Talbott asserts the rise of the KR was 'partly a result' of US policy '20 years ago', Nixon’s secret bombings etc, creating 'chaos in which the Khmer Rouge thrived. In 1975 Pol Pot seized power and unleashed a holocaust.' 'Four years and nearly 2 million deaths later, the Vietnamese invaded and installed their own regime in Phnom Penh', and for most of the world, this 'mattered more' than KR atrocities, as it meant expanding Soviet influence.
'The Khmer Rouge, whom the arch-moralist Jimmy Carter called “the worst %[??] violators of human rights in the world,” became an instrument to drive the Vietnamese out of Kampuchea. “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot,” recalled Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser, in 1981. “Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him. But China could.” The U.S., he added, “winked semipublicly” as the Chinese funneled arms to the Khmer Rouge, using Thailand as a conduit. Throughout the Reagan Administration, the Khmer Rouge have been part of a loose and unholy alliance of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla groups that the U.S. helped create. Pol Pot has lurked in the shadows of the Reagan Doctrine.' Since Vietnam withdrew (which Talbott attributes to Gorbachev’s 'overall policy of defusing Third World conflicts'), the US 'has grown increasingly concerned' the KR will 'fill a vacuum'. Though 'n response, China seems willing to cut off support to the Khmer Rouge once the Vietnamese complete their withdrawal.'
'But defanging' the KR 'will require more'. 'As Pol Pot’s mentor Mao Zedong once said, “Power comes from the barrel of a gun,” and thanks to years of Chinese-Thai assistance, with tacit American blessing, the Khmer Rouge have more guns than the two non-Communist guerrilla groups that the U.S. has been aiding directly. The CIA estimates that the Khmer Rouge have enough materiel to fight on for an additional two years against their erstwhile allies.' To avert, 'the U.S. should use its influence with China and Thailand not just to cut off arms to the Khmer Rouge but also to shut down their base camps on the Thai side of the Kampuchean border, ferret out and seize their arms caches, round up their most villainous leaders and arrange for their peaceful retirement to, say, rural North Korea.' 'For a decade, the No. 1 American objective in Kampuchea has been to get the Vietnamese out. No. 2 has been to squeeze the Vietnamese-installed rulers out of a new coalition in Phnom Penh. Until recently, preventing the Khmer Rouge from butchering their way back into dominance has been a distant No. 3.' 'Now those priorities must be reversed. Blocking the return of the Khmer Rouge should take precedence, even if it means a slower Vietnamese withdrawal and a larger role for the pro-Vietnamese faction in the new government. And no more winking at abominations.'
1989_3_05 (Steven Erlanger [based in Bangkok, Thailand] | P468/p25 NYT Magazine | Sunday 1989/3/5): THE ENDLESS WAR: THE RETURN OF THE KHMER ROUGE. He opens with a scene of a site ('Site 8', 'the only Khmer Rouge camp open to the press') at the Thai-Cambodia border, where KR soldiers oversee the transport of war material (implied from China) into Cambodia. While Site 8 is a '"civilian" camp for Cambodians displaced' in the war, monitored by the UN Border Relief Operation, 'other international aid agencies and units of the Thai Army', within the KR reigns. With Vietnam pulling out now, the KR’s 'main enemy has become the Phnom Penh Government installed by Hanoi'. 'The border region is malarial, the narrow paths through it strewn with plastic land mines, fragmentation grenades and claymores. In Site 8 alone, 1,500 of the 35,800 inhabitants are maimed. According to Son Song Hak, director of the camp’s Khmer Handicap Association, 75 percent of the handicapped are "fighters." It is, he says, "a war of mines."' If a Site 8 resident/refugee 'refuse to carry ammunition, their food rations are cut', 'summoned to sessions of political "re-education"'. Sometimes beaten, imprisoned or disappeared; '[f]ew refuse to do what they are told'.
'Today', 'at least' 350k Cambodians 'live in holding camps' 'just inside Thailand, within the sound, the range and sometimes the reach of Vietnamese shells. The Thais and the United Nations have decided they are not refugees but people displaced by war, and thus ineligible to settle in any other country. Most have had no choice in selecting the camps in which they live. Of the 100,000 or so under Khmer Rouge control, the majority either took a wrong turn crossing the border or chose the wrong guide into Thailand. Others, who ended up in the camps run by the two other resistance factions, fare somewhat better.'
'TEN YEARS AGO, THE KHMER ROUGE WAS on its knees. Weakened by ferocious internal purges and a wrecked economy, it fled from the Vietnamese invaders toward the Thai border. "One more considered push [ by the Vietnamese ] and the Khmer Rouge would have been finished," says an Asian diplomat. "Instead, they were resurrected."' But within the Sino-Soviet split, KR defeat was 'unacceptable - whatever its crimes'. So 'the Chinese revived the Khmer Rouge as the best way to harass Hanoi and Moscow. Thailand, always fearful of Vietnam’s expansionist ambitions, facilitated Chinese aid to the Khmer Rouge, happy to take a cut and to have a buffer of Khmer Rouge soldiers and Cambodian civilians between itself and Vietnam. The United States, traumatized by its military defeat in Indochina and preferring improved relations with China over those with Vietnam, sided with the Chinese and thus, ironically, with the Khmer Rouge.' In the context of 'slackening Soviet aid to Vietnam as well as Hanoi’s own economic ineptitude', the 'Chinese policy worked'. Now Vietnam 'has decided to pull out'; now there are fears the KR will again take power. Despite peace talks making 'some progress', 'the Cambodian factions remain deeply divided over the nature of an interim administration that would oversee new elections.' On one side, is Sihanouk, the 'rightists who overthrew him in 1970', and the KR, 'which [Sihanouk] detests but whose military strength he needs in fighting the Vietnamese and their ally in Phnom Penh'. Even if the Chinese cut off aid, and the Thais 'shut down the border camps that have protected and nurtured it', the KR will 'remain a formidable force'. 'American intelligence estimates of Khmer Rouge strength vary from 28,000 to nearly 60,000, with the usual interagency compromise cited officially by diplomats as "30,000 to 40,000."' There is little doubt, whatever the numbers, that the KR 'forces dwarf those of Sihanouk and Son Sann'; 16k troops are loyal to the former, and 11k to the latter.
The US also 'believe' the KR has 'stored up to two years’ worth of arms and ammunition', '[a]nd few expect aid to the Khmer Rouge to be cut off entirely', since they 'China’s only insurance in Cambodia, and it would cost Beijing little to maintain a covert channel for resupply. Nor are the Thais eager to have a suddenly desperate Khmer Rouge raiding Thai villages for money, guns and rice.'
Site 8, 'the only Khmer Rouge camp open to the press', 'is a stage set of devastating cynicism'. It is everything KR Cambodia wasn’t; colorful clothes, flourishing pagodas, markets, schooling. 'Arguing that the government-in-exile is legitimate, the Thais have not applied their own laws within the camps, leaving justice to be meted out by Cambodians running them. In Site 8, the Thais are training some Cambodians to function as an internal police force. The training includes weapons handling and lectures on the intricacies of the rocket launcher. Asked why, the Thais say that the camp has been attacked in the past by bandits with grenade launchers.' Site 8’s administrator, Seng Sok, 'will say nothing of his life under the Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot. "It’s not important," he says. He provides the standard, soothing Khmer Rouge line: Communism has been "spoiled," he says. "Everyone is a capitalist now." He wears the marks of a Khmer Rouge of rank: a row of pens in the pocket of his military-style shirt, and on his wrist, a chunky, steel-banded watch. Asked if Ta (Grandfather) Mok - the most ruthless of the Khmer Rouge commanders - considers himself a capitalist, Seng Sok says, "If we remain Communist, how could we unite with other forces?" Then he laughs.'
'Everything, he insists, has changed. Khmer Rouge, he says, "is not our name" [this seems to be technically true since at least 1975]; the Communist Party abolished itself in 1981; Pol Pot "retired" in 1985. He laughs again. There is just Democratic Kampuchea now, he says, the coalition government recognized by the United Nations.' Asked if the KR wants to re-take power, he says '"We should have elections to choose who will be President"', and that he’d vote for Sihanouk, 'with Son Sann as Prime Minister'. '"Seng Sok is a stupid man," says a Western relief official. "The camp is controlled by other people. It is as with everything in the Khmer Rouge: everything is hidden. You never meet the people in charge."'
Contra the semi-rosy [compared to their reputation] picture of Site 8, there are three other KR camps in Thailand open to the UN and 'other international agencies' (though with 'limited access'), but barred to journalists. 'Few in these camps, according to those who have escaped, have any idea that anyone other than the Khmer Rouge feeds them.' Contra Site 8, life here is much more standard KR; isolation, 'propaganda sessions', fear. 'Food and medical care are not given; they must be earned'. 'Last Christmas, unhappy with the large number of people in O’Trao seeking Western medical care, the Khmer Rouge torched the camp’s only hospital.' Secrecy is 'not only a virtue, but an obsession' for the KR. They 'hid behind the name Angka' after 1975, and 'said that Sihanouk, actually under house arrest, was running the country'. Sometimes Pol Pot was called '"Brother No. 1"', or sometimes 'referred to himself by his code name "No. 870"'. After the 'Vietnamese occupation, he has been signing his messages "No. 87." He has never acknowledged that his given name is Saloth Sar.'
In the KR’s military camps, 'just inside Thailand, where perhaps as many as 50,000 live', no outsider has access, 'and even the Thai Army - a conduit for Chinese arms to the Khmer Rouge - rarely ventures there'. 'This is "the hidden border." Here, by all accounts, the Khmer Rouge has hardly changed at all'.
Sam Vuth, who is being married, who 'defected and went to a non-Communist camp, Site 2', is skittish since 'the Khmer Rouge kills its defectors'. He was a KR soldier 'since 1973, when he was 16; in 1984, he became a battalion commander in charge of 80 to 100 soldiers fighting the Vietnamese. Like Seng Sok, he will not describe his activities while the Khmer Rouge was in power. Nor will he describe why he chose to defect. He simply says he was tired of fighting.' He was 'debriefed by Thai, American and United Nations officials, and his account of life along the hidden border is confirmed by other Cambodians who have spent time in those camps. Until last September, he lived in a camp called V.4, in Thailand’s Trat Province, near the border of Cambodia’s Koh Kong Province.' He says Pol Pot 'lived a half-hour away by truck, just inside the Thai border'; other top leaders also had such a situation. Even Son Sen, 'the commander in chief, and regional commanders like Ta Mok would come at least once a year'. V.4, with about 4k people, was a place of military study and rest, where Pol Pot lectured on such issues. He said in a 'lecture in early September' which he was present at, Pol Pot said to move in where Vietnam withdraws from, move in civilians, and that '[i]t was important, he said, to show the world that it was the Khmer Rouge who had fought hardest against the Vietnamese, so its interests could not be ignored.'.
'In the months since', the KR has moved civilians from camps, to 'so-called "repatriation villages" closer to the border, where no outsider has any access. With heavy shelling along the border, causing hundreds of casualties, the Vietnamese have thus far repulsed efforts to occupy significant areas inside Cambodia. But Vietnamese troops are leaving, and the soldiers of their ally in Phnom Penh are only modestly equipped and largely untested. Sam Vuth sees "no good future" for Cambodia. Of course, the Khmer Rouge intends to take sole power again in Cambodia - the very question seems to puzzle him. Has the Khmer Rouge changed? "A little bit," he says. It has become more practical. There is less emphasis on Pol Pot’s brand of Communism and more on driving out "the contemptible Vietnamese." Fewer violations of discipline are regarded as capital offenses. Deserters are executed, but low-ranking soldiers who botch up tend to get a "re-education" - the euphemism for beatings, torture and prison.' From refugee interviews from these 'secret camps', is a picture of a party elite with 'access to the best of everything', while others get rations. Marriage is discouraged til mid-age, 'when their best fighting days are done'. 'There is, as well, a subclass, treated as subhuman, virtually as instruments or logistics. They include anyone without a party or military role, and they are kept isolated and illiterate'. They are kept 'capitve for years in secret camps, like one near V.4 called O’Lahong'.
Per historian David P. Chandler, the KR '"regret nothing"'. 'Their "disbanding" of the party in 1981 was simply a return to the secrecy they prefer, he says. The structures of the party remain in place. "The comical, ironical point is that the central committee claimed to abolish the party and turned out the lights. It’s absurd. It was a completely pragmatic and crass gesture to help their image. Now they can call themselves the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, with a flag at the United Nations."' A 'lengthy internal document dated Dec. 2, 1986', with guidelines from the KR leadership, was 'stolen by a defector and translated last year'. Guidelines with respect to current circumstances 'and its temporary alliance with Sihanouk and Son Sann. The paper is considered genuine, says a senior Western diplomat, pointing to its insularity, race consciousness and tortured syntax.'
'The paper describes "the 30-year struggle" this way:'
"From non-existence of force to existence of force. From small to large force. From no state control to full state control. From struggle by political shadow to political struggle, to armed struggle, to five-year war, to control of the whole country and the establishment of socialism in Cambodia. And at the present time, we engage in a guerrilla war, fighting the contemptible Vietnamese enemy aggressors to defend our nation, protect our people and our Cambodian race so that it will last forever."
"In these struggles which follow one another, we use secret form, open act, half-open act, unlawful act, lawful act and half-lawful act; we fight and build forces in remote areas and cities according to the political slogan, 'National Democracy and Economy.' We use 'Economy' as a means to incite and mobilize people in the remote areas, 'Democracy' to mobilize people in the middle level such as students and intellectuals, and 'Nation' to mobilize front forces in the upper level."
While it 'acknowledges past "excesses," "errors" and "faults,"' it 'ascribes them to the manipulations of Vietnamese agents, the inexperience with power of the "base people" (the ascendant Cambodian peasantry) and the limited period of the Khmer Rouge rule: "Three years was too short a time."' It says '"we have learned our lessons"', and that 'these errors were grounded in "a spirit of patriotism and nationalism," and are minor compared with those of the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and other Socialist countries.' It also argues the Western countries also had bad history. Thus, it concludes that '"Comparing those examples that truly exist in world history, we see that the true character and value of Democratic Kampuchea is far higher. Democratic Kampuchea has never violated or abused anybody."'
'At last month’s conference in Jakarta, Khmer Rouge officials went out of their way to put on an affable face', seeking the press to make overtures of their transformation 'and willing even to ban notorious figures like Pol Pot and Ta Mok from any political involvement.' '"Khmer Rouge tactics have shifted," says a Western diplomat, "but certainly not their goals. Anyone who believes they would be content to share power is living in cloud-cuckoo-land."' This all coincides with 'an improvement, albeit modest, within Cambodia'. Despite Hun Sen’s (now 37) association with the Vietnamese (and earlier background with the KR, from which he defected), 'Cambodians are nevertheless responding favorably to his efforts, especially in the last two years, to moderate his brand of socialism.' Land is returned to 'individual farmers', there is some private business, 'pagodas have been reconstructed'. Over the past 10 years, Hun Sen transformed from 'the shy, awkward Khmer Rouge commander' 'into a leader the Vietnamese believe stands a good chance of keeping his seat'. He believes his 'Government has earned legitimacy through its efforts to rebuild the nation and defend it from the Khmer Rouge.' The country has 'made progress in recogvering' from the '"Pol Pot time"'. There are still issues, such as with the capital’s water supply and sewage-treatment plant. Poverty still haunts the cities, and there is 'insecurity in the countryside'. The govt has 44k troops, and a militia of 100k. Still, the country is 'not pacified', and the KR 'at any given time', per 'Western military experts', 'has as many as' 20k fighters 'inside Cambodia, harassing villages, killing village chiefs.'
'Shunned by much of the world, Hun Sen contends that if anyone can hold off the Khmer Rouge it is he and his army, and that if Sihanouk and Son Sann had any sense, they would make common cause with him. Instead of pretending that the Chinese formula of a four-party government and army - made up of his forces and those of the three guerrilla factions - can somehow co-opt the Khmer Rouge, says Hun Sen, leave the Khmer Rouge in the forest and unite against it.' Still, his internationally 'credibility appears to be growing'. Thailand even hosted him in January, infuriating Sihanouk, 'who sees Hun Sen as a traitor'. An 'Asian diplomat' thinks that, especially with the Vietnamese gone, and if international efforts are made to help Cambodia, the KR morale will decline. Yet it '"would require the expenditure of great treasure and blood by those willing to do it."' 'And would would that be?' '"That’s just it," he says. "You’ve got to be willing to fight. That’s the big question with the non-Communist resistance, and with Hun Sen’s army, too. The Khmer Rouge will fight."' He says the KR does have big vulnerabilities; ie if the Thais close the camps, if there is an 'international peacekeeping force in Cambodia', and that now the Vietnamese are gone, some 'might tire of the endless war'. Another weakness 'is the hatred in which it [the KR] is held'.
'Nonetheless, says a former diplomat and an authority on the Khmer Rouge, it is a mistake to think the guerrillas have no political, nationalist or class support in the countryside. Under Pol Pot, the urban bourgeoisie suffered more than the peasantry. The Khmer Rouge has regenerated itself with new recruits, and not merely from intimidation. "They are, after all," says the former diplomat, "the only Cambodians really fighting the Vietnamese."' 'A Western diplomat' says the US has become more 'realis[t]' recently, happy both the Vietnamese and KR are out, and willing to come to '"a solution more on Hun Sen’s terms than Sihanouk or Washington would like, at least there’s a fair chance of pulling it off."'
Next, Erlanger talks with Son Song Hak, a confident, articulate 31 year old who '"became a soldier in 1979, when the Vietnamese aggressor came to my country. The only person who led us to fight against the Vietnamese was Pol Pot."' He 'behaves like a trusted party member', and says he 'taught himself English by listening to the Voice of America and the BBC. Before 1979, he "drove a tractor on a collective farm" in Battambang Province.' Asked 'what went wrong', he says '"If something crumbled between 1975 and 1978," he says smoothly, "we can fault both Pol Pot and the Vietnamese, who started their aggression long ago. Pol Pot made revolution because he wanted to do something good for the country. Perhaps he was confused about the nature of Communism."' He says that '[t]he party has reformed', and '[t]hings are much improved - just look around. "You couldn’t see children at school then ... You couldn’t see people walking and smiling [or] wearing different colored clothing."' He says now Cambodians need to 'settle their differences and unite. Words are a problem'; even sometimes 'people don’t mean what they say'.
The Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand are governed by 'three factions united against Vietnam', together form the 'United Nations-recognized Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea'. Sihanouk’s forces are 'concentrated in Site B, a relatively well-run camp of about 60,000 people'. 'Son Sann ... is the nominal head of the hopelessly divided and corrupt Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, whose various warlords control a sprawling collection of camps called Site 2 (with a total population of 179,000) as well as a smaller camp in the south of Thailand, Sok Sann (population: about 9,000).'. Pol Pot’s CPK, 'which Sihanouk long ago labeled the Khmer Rouge', 'is the best-armed, best-trained and most disciplined group in the coalition'. In their years of power, they 'transformed the country into a Maoist, highly xenophobic, peasant-dominated land. A fifth of the population of about seven million died from overwork, starvation, disease or execution. The Khmer Rouge camps are Site 8, Borai, Ta Luan and O’Trao. There are also an unknown number of secret military camps, such as V. 4. About 100,000 people live in these camps.'
Three articles here ([see below] | P01 | Thursday 1989/4/6): VIETNAM PROMISES TROOPS WILL LEAVE CAMBODIA BY FALL
1989_4_05_a (Steven Erlanger in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam | [see above]): Pol Pot Denounced - hanoi Urges an End to Military Aid to the 3 Insurgent Factions. 'Ten years and three months after its soldiers invaded Cambodia and installed a new Government in Phnom Penh, Vietnam announced today that it would unconditionally withdraw the rest of its troops by the end of September.' Previously they 'insisted' 'would have to be linked to a cutoff of all foreign military aid to the three factions that oppose Hanoi’s ally in Phnom Penh, Prime Minister Hun Sen', or else the withdrawl wouldn’t be til end of 1990. Vietnam says it has 50k troop sthere; the US estimate 60k-70k. 'Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia has been, along with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, one of the major East-West issues.' It has stalled PRC-USSR relations, as well as Vietnam’s 'own efforts to obtain aid and recognition' from the US, which 'insiste[d] that Hanoi withdraw its troops from Cambodia first.' Today, Vietnam just urges the opposition’s supporters, ie China, 'to honor promises to stop all military aid when Vietnam withdraws'. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia jointly declared they 'reserved the right of Phnom Penh to request further "assistance" if military aid to the opposition did not stop.' It also said that 'the nations of the world should take responsibility for insuring that the Cambodian civil war ends and that the "genocidal Pol Pot regime" not be allowed to take power again in Cambodia.'
Sihanouk leads '[t]he Cambodian opposition', 'and includes his followers, those of a former Prime Minister, Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge. Under Pol Pot, a Khmer Rouge Government allied with China oversaw the deaths of at least a million Cambodians from April 1975 until the Vietnamese invaded on Dec. 25, 1978.' from Beijing, Sihanouk today gave a statement that Vietnam’s withdrawl be '"controlled" and supervised by' the UN; that China would only cut aid if the UN verified the withdrawl. 'There was no official reaction from China. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia resulted in a Western boycott on aid and trade with Vietnam and a reduction of normal relations with the United States.' Erlanger reports that the 'fragile state' of Vietnam’s economy, and 'need for Western aid and investment necessitated an early end to their occupation, and that Mr. Hun Sen will be strong enough by September to keep his seat if the Chinese can be convinced to stop military aid to the Khmer Rouge. According to Vietnamese officials, five to seven Vietnamese soldiers are wounded or killed every day in Cambodia. Since 1978, there have been about 55,000 Vietnamese casualties, a third of whom were killed.' Today, Vietnam 'called on India, Canada and Poland', with a UN representative, 'to organize an International Control Commission to oversee and verify Vietnam’s withdrawal and the end of aid to all Cambodian factions.' Those three countries 'performed a similar role after the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954.' Vietnam urged Cambodian factions to meet and find a resolution 'before the end of September and to allow resumption of the regional peace process, suspended in February in Jakarta, Indonesia.'
'The Cambodian opposition coalition was formed after the Vietnamese invasion, when hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops invaded Vietnam in February 1979 "to teach Vietnam a lesson" and then soon withdrew.' With ASEAN support, China 'revived the Khmer Rouge to try to drive out the Vietnamese and Mr. Hun Sen, and put together the opposition coalition with the acquiescence of the United States. The United Nations recognizes the coalition as Cambodia’s legitimate government.' Sihanouk 'has agreed to meet Mr. Hun Sen in Jakarta on May 2 for further talks on an internal settlement. Mr. Hun Sen, who defected from the Khmer Rouge in 1978 during fierce internal purges, is expected to try once more to persuade the Prince to break with the Khmer Rouge and join him in a neutral and non-aligned Cambodia that would no longer be called the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. But China is unlikely to favor such a move, especially now that Vietnam has decided to withdraw unconditionally.'
1989_4_05_b (Special to The New York Times from Beijing | P06/A06 | [see above] ): Hun Sen Offers to Sihanouk. 'The unconditional Vietnamese troop withdrawal was one of two concessions that Mr. Hun Sen had offered in a message last week to Prince Sihanouk, a Vietnamese diplomat in the Chinese capital said today.' The 2nd concession was 'related to constitutional issues.' While Hun Sen 'was unwilling to dismantle the Government in preparation for new elections, as rival Cambodian factions have proposed, he is prepared to discuss such issues as the country’s name, national song, and government structure, the diplomat said.'
1989_4_05_c (AP from Washington DC | P06/A06 | [see above] ): U.S. Praises Hanoi’s Plan. 'The State Department praised Vietnam’s announcement today, saying the step would restore peace to Cambodia. "Although we have not yet seen complete details of the Vietnamese statement, we do believe that if the withdrawal is carried out, it would be a positive development," said Richard Boucher, a department spokesman.'
1989_4_07 (Steven Erlanger in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam | P01 | Sunday 1989/4/9): Vietnam’s Vietnam: Scars of Cambodia. 'Vietnam’s unconditional withdrawal from Cambodia by the end of September, announced Wednesday, will conclude an ordeal of duty, sacrifice, suffering and hubris that caused internal pressures similar to those faced by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the United States in Vietnam itself.' For all three, 'the end of a military adventure that began with security concerns and ideological idealism was ambivalent, without clear resolution, let alone the accustomed victory, and left an uncertain future for their client regimes.' Many Vietnamese are proud of their involvement, 'for the salvation of a close neighbor from the degradation and genocide of the Khmer Rouge Government of Pol Pot, whom Vietnamese troops ousted from power when they invaded Dec. 25, 1978.' They also are proud of their assistance to the Hun Sen govt, rebuilding from 'the detritus of "Year Zero," as Cambodians called the period after the flight of the Khmer Rouge.'
'"International law did nothing against Pol Pot," said Thai Duy, on the editorial board of the weekly Dai Doan Ket, or Great Solidarity. "If that genocidal regime lasted two years more, what would have become of Cambodia? Would that nation still exist?"' There’s also just the relief of soldiers returning to families after 'dangerous duty'; 55k casualties, 'including some 18,000 dead'; 'Vietnam will finally be at peace for almost the first time since the resistance against the French began in the early 1930’s.' For some though, Cambodia 'is a metaphor for Vietnam’s recent and ongoing "renovation": a more realistic policy at last emerging after a tremendous sacrifice by the peasant class in pursuit of a miscalculated and dogmatic adventure by an unchanging and relatively unsophisticated elite.' One official said '"this is our version of Afghanistan. We are forced to go by our own internal difficulties and declining economy, the need for jobs and Western investment to solidify our renovation. And we stayed too long. We can no longer afford to be isolated in the world when our neighbors in Southeast Asia are developing with such speed."' writer and 'editor of the monthly magazine Van, a journal of literature and reportage', Anh Duc, said Vietnam had become too proud after beating the US, '"we thought we could have a victory in everything else."' Vietnamese policy 'on nearly all topics, including Cambodia, began to change significantly only at the end of 1986, when Nguyen Van Linh, now 73, was named Communist Party General Secretary and "renovation" was begun.' This is the reform of the centrally-planned state, and 'is somewhat chaotic', but the aim is clear, requiring opening to 'the democracies of Asia' and the West for 'investment and aid'. But there is resistance to 'the change as a deviation from Communism and a discrediting of the past'. This, along with the Hun Sen govt weakness and security concerns, 'goes a long way to explain why Vietnam remained in Cambodia so long', say 'Vietnamese officials'.
'Maj. Gen. Tran Cong Man, editor of Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the Army People’s Daily, provided two further reasons - error and pride. In an interview, he said that Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnamese border villages in 1977 and 1978 required a response. "It seems to us it was something we had to do," he said. "And when we sent our troops to chase away Pol Pot, we thought it was a great victory."' He said '"during our stay"', they did too much of the work, '"[i]nstead of helping the Cambodians to grow up"'. The conclusion they reached is '"that the revolution of each country and the independence of each country must be managed by each nation themselves. And the support of others can only be secondary."' He 'also admitted that there has been some disaffection among those who have returned from the front to face a not always appreciative citizenry and to try to find a job in an economy with an unemployment rate of up to 30 percent.' They can thus cause trouble, such a soldier who 'started shooting into the sky' when refused admission on a bus.
General Man 'also said that logistical support was sometimes lacking, with poverty-stricken areas sometimes shortchanging military units on rice supplies'. Asked if war weariness was comparable to in the US during the Vietnam War, 'he smiled and said that North Vietnam had been war-weary, too. But at that time, he said, everyone in the country suffered hardships. "But now, only part of the society had to fight, and the rest lived peacefully. And that is why the relations of the soldiers in the rear is different now."' 'Nearly every family' 'has a relative or friend who served in Cambodia', and have been told the soldiers have '"gloriously fulfilled their duty to help the Cambodian people wholeheartedly and unselfishly"'. But families struggle 'to make ends meet' in a country with low wages. 'Vu Kim Hanh, the 37-year-old editor of the newspaper Tuoi Tre, or Youth, said she had instructed her journalists "that we must affirm that there is a big social and political problem for the returnees. The soldiers worry that the war is over and people will forget everything they have sacrificed, and if we forget, it is terribly wrong."'
'[N]oted novelist and screenwriter' Nguyen Quang Sang, 56, 'lives next door to the former house of the late General Edward Lansdale, the American intelligence agent who did much to form early American policy in Vietnam.' His 16-year-old son is 'good at engineering', and doesn’t want him to '"have to participate in warfare as I had to do"'. '"Let the Cambodians build any 'ism' they want to," Mr. Sang said. "It’s up to them. Perhaps the kingdom will come back. But let them build a regime suitable to themselves."'
1989_5_25 (Eric Pace | P105/D22 Business Day | Thursday 1989/5/25): Andreas Hillgruber, 64, Historian In West German Dispute, Is Dead. 'Prof. Andreas Hillgruber, a prominent West German historian who was involved in a controversy bearing on the "final solution," died May 8 in a hospital in Cologne after a long illness, his widow, Karin, confirmed when reached by telephone at their home yesterday. His death, at the age of 64, had been reported in the West German press.' He was 'an authority on Hitler’s Third Reich and had joined the faculty of the University of Cologne in 1972.' History professor Francis L. Loewenheim at Rice University, Houston, said '"Andreas Hillgruber was probably the leading West German historian of his generation - a scholar of indefatigable energy and fierce independence, a scholar of weighty judgment even if one did not always agree with him."' His 1986 book "Two Kinds of Destruction: The Shattering of the German Reich and the End of European Jewry" 'helped instigate a debate that sharply split German scholars and journalists for a time.' 'It suggested a connection between the collapse of the German Army’s eastern front in World War II and the genocide carried out against the European Jews.' It also 'gave long accounts of mass rape and "barbarian" behavior by Soviet troops advancing from the east toward Berlin', and 'contended that Austria, more than Germany, had fostered the strong anti-Semitism that led to the death camps, and that it was Hitler’s own personal hatred for the Jews that led to the "final solution," as the Nazis called the mass killing. By juxtaposing the collapse of the eastern front and the genocide, Professor Hillgruber implicitly invited moral comparison of the two.'
Shortly after, 'noted West German sociologist' Jurgen Habermas wrote 'in the liberal weekly Die Zeit 'challenged the book and criticized what he called "apologetic tendencies in the writing of modern German history." He contended that Mr. Hillgruber and other West German scholars were engaged in a "new revisionism" meant to imbue their country with "a NATO philosophy with a German national coloring." The "historians’ dispute," as it became known, also involved some scholars’ efforts to compare the genocide to mass murders in other parts of the world, like Stalin’s purges or the killings in Cambodia under Pol Pot.' 'Eventually, the President of West Germany, Richard von Weizsacker felt constrained to declare in October before a congress of West German historians: "Auschwitz remains unique. It was perpetrated by Germans in the name of Germany. This truth is immutable and will not be forgotten."' He thus 'declared an end to the dispute, and Professor Hillgruber said he completely agreed'. He said he 'never tried to "relativize" the past, but only to gain understanding of its times and conditions'. Herbert Kremp ('West German writer and journalist') defended him 'after his death' in Die Welt, that in Hillgruber’s 1980 book made clear he viewed Nazi crimes as '"singular" and consequently not comparable to others'.
Hillgruber was born in 1925 in a town now in Poland, son of a 'secondary school teacher'. 'The West German press reported earlier this month that the father was forced by the Nazis, for political reasons, to give up teaching and that the son became a prisoner of war in World War II.' After, he 'earned a doctorate at the University of Gottingen in West Germany', taught at Marburg and Freiburg, authored 'more than a dozen books', 'and was praised by Gordon A. Craig, the noted American historian of Germany, for his "masterful delineation of Hitler’s grand strategical plan."'
1989_9_10 (Lynn Hunt ('a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of "Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution."') | P85/p12 Book Review | Sunday 1989/9/10): IT’S NOT OVER TILL ITS OVER, AND IT’S NOT OVER; Book: A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION Edited by Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer (published 9/9/1989). It seems among 'hundreds of books on the French Revolution published during this year of the bicentennial', a dictionary wouldn’t be important, but this is 'really a manifesto representing the views of Francois Furet, who is now the most influential historian of the French Revolution in the world'. Over 'the last decade', he 'published four books developing his interpretation', summarizing his view in the 22 articles (of 99) he contributed, 'including the crucial ones on the Terror, revolutionary government, Jacobinism, Marx and Tocqueville. The collaboration of a number of young philosophers of law and politics in this dictionary, now ably translated by Arthur Goldhammer, is a tribute to Mr. Furet’s success in developing a whole new field of studies in which traditional narrative history, the history of ideas and political philosophy are combined - in the spirit of Raymond Aron and Hannah Arendt - to investigate the philosophical foundations of modern democratic politics.'
His 'intellectual ambitions and academic successes have helped propel him to the forefront in this year of commemoration and reflection on the meaning of 1789'. At a 'big international conference' in Paris 'in July', the news media was riveted by his absence ('he said he prefers smaller meetings'). He had earlier said '"the French Revolution is over," meaning almost all of the French had come to accept the legacy of 1789', despite continuing debate. 'Just when the revolutionary heritage of the French Republic seemed to have been finally assimilated, its commemoration has called forward a wave of furiously antirevolutionary works, in French and in English.'
'In France, a major controversy has erupted over the counterrevolutionary rebellion in the Vendee region of western France in 1793. Some now refer to it as the Franco-French genocide (with obvious allusions to the Holocaust and the Cambodian massacres), and claims are made that at least one-third and perhaps even more of the population of western France was deliberately exterminated by the revolutionary Government.' In Simon Schama’s 'best-selling history of the French Revolution, "Citizens"', he 'endorses all the most exravagant - and hotly contested - claims about the Vendee', and denounces all about the revolution. He thus calls into question such things as 'the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen'. 'This outpouring of antirevolutionary writing challenges all of the prevailing orthodoxies', and Furet’s 'article on academic history in this dictionary' argues that 'radical republicans, Marxists and, more recently, Communist Party historians' have 'dominated for generations' 'writing about the French Revolution in France'. Though disagreeing 'why the revolution failed', who were villains/heros, what were the turning points, 'all agreed that the revolution was good'.
'Mr. Furet himself has led the way in criticizing the orthodox Marxist interpretation of the revolution as the triumph of the capitalist bourgeoisie, but he has always stopped short of condemning the revolutionary experience out of hand. In the dictionary, he tries to make clear how he differs both from the orthodox Marxists and from the new wave of antirevolutionary historians.' 'This differentiation is by no means easy, for his vision is deeply pessimistic about the totalitarian tendencies of democratic politics, at least in their French version. In contrast to the antirevolutionary historians, however, he and his collaborators find the democratic experience profoundly interesting, even when it is troubling', and he, with Mona Ozouf, insist on 'ambivalent stakes' and 'complexity', rather than 'blanket dismissals'. Furet 'has the prudence to avoid endorsing the wildest claims about the repression of the Vendee'; he blames Louis XVI’s 'problem of establishing real authority' on his 'sexual impotence in his younger years'. Ozouf shows in 'her equally successful picture of the terrible Marat on the other end of the political spectrum' 'how the "prophet of woe" and demander of heads could be at once peripheral to revolutionary politics and exemplary of a hidden tendency toward terrorism.'
While not giving blanket claims of good/bad, 'they and their collaborators here repeatedly trace all subsequent problems of French democracy to key decisions in 1789'. 'In the period leading up to October 1789, "everything there was to say about the new principles was already said." The Terror, and the despotic and totalitarian tendencies available in democratic ideology, were there.' University of Chicago’s [of 'Chicago boys' fame] Keith M. Baker 'claims the National Assembly chose a radical Rousseauian definition of the constitution as created de novo by sovereign will. By opting for a language of political will rather than a discourse of interests grounded in modern civil society, he claims, the Assembly "was opting for the Terror" four years before the fact.' Furet 'develops the same argument. The Terror cannot be explained by circumstances, but only by reference to a democratic ideology that attributed unlimited powers to political action; "the mentality of revolutionary activism" had existed since the early summer of 1789.' The problem was 'French democratic ideology' was 'conceived in terms of "unanimity, as opposed to the chaos and conflict born of the clash of selfish private interests."'
Yet Hunt believes '[t]here are many problems with this reduction of the Terror to a spinning out of the principles of 1789. Despite the protests of the editors, it has the effect of minimizing, if not ignoring, the complexities of revolutionary events, in particular the development of democratic practices. No article discusses democratic politics in the period 1795-99, for instance, when the Jacobin Clubs were officially suppressed and then forced to regroup for the first time as an opposition party. How "a temple of orthodoxy . . . a fanaticized ruling party," as Mr. Furet puts it in his article on Jacobinism, could become a loyal opposition remains utterly mysterious.' A 'consideration of the [Declaration of] rights of man' shows '[t]he dangers of the abstract philosophical approach implicit in this kind of historical reduction'. In one article, 'political philosopher' Marcel Gauchet 'repeats the Furet line', that August 1789 was the '"moment of crystallization" of Rousseauist ideas from which all later radicalization followed', and thus the 'fundamental defect' of the Declaration was giving the 'legislature pre-eminent authority', thus able to 'usurp sovereignty four years later', thus per Gauchet, 'the founding text "embodied in condensed form a concept of liberty that prevented its realization"'. This 'overlooks the force of the idea of the rights of man, which has remained powerful' to this day. 'It is no accident that Eastern Bloc dissidents have taken up this cry as their own in the 1980’s'. 'Almost incredibly, there is no discussion in the article on the rights of man - or in any other related one for that matter - of the rights of Jews, Protestants, blacks or women, each of which aroused public debate from the earliest days of the revolution and continued to evolve in sometimes unpredictable fashion during the course of events. The French Revolution gave French Jews and Protestants full civil and political rights for the first time. The National Convention abolished slavery in 1794, but refused to countenance women’s public participation in politics and banned women’s clubs. Much could be made - not all of it to the Revolution’s credit - of these passionately interesting discussions, but to address them would require giving up the notion that all was settled once and for all by September or October 1789. The chaos and conflict of opinion continued right up to 1799 and the advent of Napoleon.'
Furet et al. have 'revived interest in the philosophical problems of modern democracy and shown the importance of the French Revolution in establishing the limits of modern political debate', though 'it is doubtful they will have the lst word any more than the Marxist or republican historians before them did'. These 1989 controversies have 'cleared the terrain'. 'The Marxist interpretation is now in the same disarray as the French Communisty Party, which has been steadily losing ground in French elections'. 'Mr. Furet and Ms. Ozouf have presented an alternative manifesto clearly based on a line of liberal thought that runs from Benjamin Constant and Madame de Stael in the 1790’s to Hannah Arendt in the 1950’s and 60’s. It is not obvious, however, that a new liberalism will succeed in France among either the intellectuals or the electorate. But that is the fascination of the French Revolution and the political legacy it has left: the options always seem to remain open, the fundamental questions are never definitively answered. As Mr. Furet himself concludes in his article on Tocqueville, "Perhaps he never believed that history would one day allow him to dispel its mystery completely."'
1989_9_14 (Thomas L. Friedman in Washington DC | P09/A09 | Friday 1989/9/15): House Panel Assails U.S. Policy on Khmer Rouge. 'The Administration’s policy of supporting a settlement in Cambodia that would bring the Khmer Rouge guerrillas into a transitional government came under stinging attack today in Congress.' The issue became more contentious as Vietnam is withdrawing, 'which is to be completed this month'. 'A peace conference of the competing factions ended last month in Paris without agreement on a power-sharing arrangement, and continued fighting appears likely. Doubts are being raised among lawmakers about whether the United States should continue backing Prince Sihanouk, with either lethal or nonlethal aid, especially considering his alliance with the Khmer Rouge.' '"The United States of America does not have the luxury of recusing itself from moral judgments," said Representative Jim Leach, Republican of Iowa. "In this regard there is a view of many, including this member, that Pol Pot should be brought before an international tribunal for war crimes."' 'In the Administration’s first Congressional testimony on Cambodia since the Paris talks, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard H. Solomon, appeared today before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.' He said it might appear the US’s position in Paris 'might not seem "particularly morally impressive"', it was the only realistic one, and had a 'possibility of ultimately undermining' the KR through 'political means'. Mr. Solomon put the 'major question before the Administration' as '"Should the Khmer Rouge, responsible for genocidal violence of the 1970’s, be totally excluded from the political process with only a military option? Or, should it -less its top leadership - be given a limited stake in a transitional political coalition that would, under international supervision," face the test of Cambodian elections?'
'"From an American perspective," he said, "we want no role for the Khmer Rouge in a future Cambodian government."' But he says Sihanouk, China, and the ASEAN felt 'the chances of peace' are better if the KR is in the 'interim coalition', which would also include Sihanouk, Hun Sen, and Son Sann et al. '"We are not schoolchildren in this business," said Mr. Solomon, alluding to the history of Khmer Rouge brutality. "The chances of avoiding continuing conflict are not very good. But we firmly believe that the chances are much better to get this problem under control if you have a structured political settlement than if you just leave a situation that is totally unstructured or unconstrained, where civil conflict is almost a certainty." Representative Chester G. Atkins, Democrat of Massachusetts, told Mr. Solomon there was "every indication from people that the Khmer Rouge will continue to fight whether they are part of a settlement or not. It would seem to me that there is no reason we would want to insist that the Khmer Rouge be part of a settlement other than the fact that Sihanouk wants it. It would seem that in light of the outcome in Paris that Sihanouk is increasingly playing a personal agenda which relates to his own political aggrandizement and less and less of a nationalist Cambodian agenda."'
1989_9_26 (Steven Erlander in Moc Bai, Vietnam | P06/A06 | Wednesday 1989/9/27): With Vietnamese Out, Cambodia Faces Bitter Fight. 'What Vietnam says is its last column of troops in Cambodia began moving through this border crossing early this morning, nearly 11 years after Vietnamese soldiers invaded Cambodia and ousted the brutal Khmer Rouge Government of Pol Pot.' Amidst diplomatic deadlock [in Paris talks], Heng Samrin 'issued a statement calling on Cambodians to unite to defend the country against the Khmer Rouge, who he said would try to take advantage of the Vietnamese withdrawal to mount new attacks'. 'A Vietnamese official said today that it was "sad" that the world required warfare to clarify what diplomacy could not and that "it also represents a moral failure to confront the reality of the Khmer Rouge."' While there were celebrations at the border, Ho Chi Minh City crowds 'seemed only moderately enthusiastic' to a 9,000 soldier column marching home. 'The column was led by a regiment awarded a collective medal as Heroes of Vietnam for its bravery in fighting the Khmer Rouge, which still threatens the security of the Vietnamese-installed Government in Phnom Penh.'
Army officials noted some 700 vehicles in the column 'had broken down', journalists 'traveling from Phnom Penh this morning said a few trucks had overturned and others had blown tires or had simply ceased to function, sometimes blocking the road. The ferry across the Mekong River at Neak Luong also became a major bottleneck. But Vietnamese officers insisted, as they have done consistently, that all of Vietnam’s troops were on their way out of Cambodia and that none would be left behind. They denied that any had remained to don Cambodian uniforms, as asserted by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the leader of the opposition coalition fighting the Phnom Penh Government of Prime Minister Hun Sen.' If the total withdrawl is accepted by China, the West, and ASEAN, resolves the issue of 'Vietnam’s long occupation of its neighbor'. 'But all of the non-Communist world except India continues to regard Mr. Hun Sen and his administration as illegitimate while supporting Prince Sihanouk and his coalition allies: the Khmer Rouge, under whose rule more than one million Cambodians died, and the followers of former Prime Minister Son Sann.' Diplomatic failures have made Cambodia’s 'future' appear 'bleak'. A 'four-party power-sharing administration leading to new elections' is the formal proposal, but Hun Sen 'absolutely rejects any pre-election role in government for the Khmer Rouge', and '[w]arfare is expected to increase'.
'The problem for the United States and Asean, Western diplomats in Bangkok say, is that Mr. Hun Sen’s Government and army remain the only real obstacle to a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. The non-Communist forces remain a relatively unimportant factor in the military equation. That has led to awkwardness in American policy, Asian diplomats in Bangkok say, because no administration wants to be seen as even indirectly aiding the Khmer Rouge, who are supplied by China, to return to power. "The United States does not want to legitimize Hun Sen, recognize a Vietnamese fait accompli in Cambodia or sell out Prince Sihanouk," an Asian diplomat said. "But Hun Sen is all that stands between Cambodians and the Khmer Rouge. What will the United States do if Hun Sen’s army starts to crumble?" The Vietnamese, not surprisingly, ask the same question.' They put the 'resonsibility for any new genocide in Cambodia' with those who opposed Vietnam’s invasion, supplying arms to 'Hun Sen’s opposition'. While Vietnam has tried for 'well over a year' to ties its withdrawl to a 'cessation of all external military aid to all the warring factions', the West and ASEAN rejects any 'partial solution' which doesn’t 'include a change of administration in Phnom Penh'. Hun Sen continues to try to split Sihanouk from the KR-lead coalition and join him, which would 'bring immediate legitimacy to Phnom Penh and badly needed Western aid'. Since then, Sihanouk 'seems to have moved further away' from Hun Sen. China opposes the idea, as well as the Prince’s wife and son ('who commands the Sihanouk army'). 'In recent statements from Beijing, Prince Sihanouk has derided the Vietnamese withdrawal as farcical and fraudulent.'
'At the same time, large cracks have appeared in the international front against Mr. Hun Sen, with Thailand in particular increasing informal commercial and diplomatic contacts with him.' This has strained ASEAN unity, but they say Vietnamese troops were their 'major concern', and they can’t 'afford to isolate a neighbor or try to pretend that Communist Indochina is not an integral part of the region. Indonesia and Malaysia have always worried more about China’s intentions in Southeast Asia than those of Vietnam, and while the Government of Singapore seems unalterably opposed to Mr. Hun Sen, Singaporean businessmen are extremely active in Phnom Penh. The United States has made normalization of relations with Vietnam contingent not only on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia but also on a comprehensive diplomatic settlement there.'
1989_9_27_a (Editorial Staff | P28/p01 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Wednesday 1989/9/27): Bankrupt and Immoral on Cambodia. 'Vietnamese troops have finally left Cambodia. But with no agreed transition plan, Cambodians face a stark contest between the Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen regime and the genocidal Khmer Rouge. And the Bush Administration now has to face the bankruptcy of its policy of backing Prince Sihanouk along with his Khmer Rouge allies and of opposing Hun Sen. Morality and practicality require a new approach.' Sihanouk lead an anti-Vietnamese 'occupation' coalition with the KR and non-Communist forces; since the 'occupation has now ended, and the real force in the coalition looks increasingly like the old, unreformed Khmer Rouge. Incredibly, these killers, already to blame for more than a million deaths, seem poised for a possible comeback. U.S. policy collapsed in embarrassment last month when the 19-nation Paris peace conference on Cambodia fell apart.' Rather than produce an 'all-party interim government', it saw instead Sihanouk 'act like a broker' for KR interests. 'The Hun Sen regime, which has yet to demonstrate its legitimacy, was fully justified in rejecting the Prince’s demand that the Khmer Rouge share power. With Vietnamese troops now withdrawn, U.S. relations with Hun Sen, and with Hanoi, could usefully be reassessed.'
The US 'reasonably' 'believed' a 'settlement that excluded the' KR 'could be vulnerable' to KR 'disruption from the outside'. But it’s unreasonable to expect Sihanouk bringing them into 'a settlement without conceding them real power', and '[t]he Paris conference revealed the illogic of the U.S. position'. If the Khmer Rouge were so strong that they could not be safely excluded from a broad-based interim regime, then weren’t they also likely to dominate their non-Communist partners? The Prince appears to have become a prisoner of his Khmer Rouge allies, but Washington need not be. It is unlikely that any U.S. policy can save Cambodia from renewed civil war. But decency demands that Washington distance itself further from the Khmer Rouge and from Prince Sihanouk. Cambodia’s future is likely to be discussed again at the current U.N. General Assembly session, and perhaps at a reconvened Paris conference. That gives the Administration a chance to make emphatically clear that no Cambodian settlement offering the Khmer Rouge any political or military role is acceptable. Perhaps the U.S. cannot now design the right peace formula, but at least it can abandon a profoundly wrong moral course.'
1989_9_27_b (Jim Leach (a 'Republican of Iowa, is ranking member of the Asian and Pacific affairs subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.') | P29/p01 Letters to the Editor | Wednesday 1989/9/27): Don’t Help Pol Pot. Try Him. 'Sometimes, nations are compelled to opt for the moral high ground rather than comply with a policy of alleged pragmatism that may produce an ethical abomination. Such is the situation in Cambodia today. Between 1975 and 1979, upward of two million people - one-sixth of the Cambodian population - fell victim to the genocidal policies of Pol Pot and the Communist Khmer Rouge. In turn, Vietnamese imperialists used this tragedy as a rationale for invading Cambodia, extending their military and political hegemony in Southeast Asia. In view of this history, our policies in Cambodia should be animated above all by a refusal to countenance the return to power of Pol Pot. But that isn’t the case.'
Our Cambodia policy since the Vietnam War has been 'disengagement', from one extreme (''we had the only answers') to another. 'Accordingly, we have deferred too often in strategy and philosophy to the judgment of regional actors', thus Washington 'has fallen prey to the lowest policy denominator', letting China, ASEAN, and Sihanouk take the reigns of 'American diplomacy'. 'Credulously, the State Department has succumbed to the entreaties of these parties, each of which has a private agenda', and thus back a 'four-party transitional government' which includes the KR. 'Yet, there is no credible evidence that the political rehabilitation of the Khmer Rouge, which this policy implies, does anything except strengthen the hand of Pol Pot and his savage henchmen.' Sihanouk might 'make his bed' with the KR 'and their sponsors in Beijing', but US 'need not'. 'Communists and royalists are frequently at odds, but they have one thing in common - an antipathy to democratic institutions. In Cambodia, the forces of political elitism have formed an unholy alliance that should not be sanctioned. Instead of giving our stamp of approval, we should wash our hands of the sordid alliance and stand for our principles, not someone else’s expediency.' 'The U.S. canot pursue policies that violate basic moral precepts. With inexplicable reluctance, the State Department acknowledges that genocide occurred in Cambodia. But this acknowledgement lacks conviction because our policies contradict it.'
'Pol Pot should be tried as one of the great criminals of the 20th century, not countenanced as the eminence grise behind a new Cambodian government. The Khmer Rouge should be disarmed and universally discredited, not allowed to wreak havoc again in a once gentle land.' Rather than the four-party plan, the US should tap 'whatever reservoir of good will' it has at the UN to demand a peacekeeping deployment, not only to 'oversee Vietnam’s withdrawl but to make possible the holding of credible, democratic elections', and counter the KR, 'put[ting] a brake' on Sihanouk’s 'pathetic fronting' for them. 'Mass murderers must understand there is a day of reckoning. Whether the crime is committed behind barbed wire at Auschwitz or in the killing fields of Southeast Asia, justice must be pursued. Unfortunately, there is no sitting international criminal court. The World Court exclusively adjudicates disputes between states.'
'The U.S. should demand the establishment of an international tribunal, modeled on Nuremberg, to hold international criminals accountable for their crimes, from terrorism, genocide and torture to narcotics trafficking and attacks against diplomats. Pol Pot should be its first defendant.'
1989_11_16 (Paul Lewis at the United Nations, New York City | P17/A17 | Friday 1989/11/17): U.N. Backs Measure on Cambodia That Allows Khmer Rouge a Role. The UNGA 'overwhelmingly approved a resolution today calling for a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. The settlement would give the Khmer Rouge a role in an interim government led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk while internationally supervised elections are prepared. But for the second year running, the resolution also warns against a return to the "universally condemned policies and practices of the recent past." That is an allusion to the brutal four-year rule of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge, during which at least one million people died in politicial purges, famines and epidemics as the Khmer Rouge attempted to impose agrarian communism on the largely urban population.'
Though the ' resolution is phrased vaguely and does not mention the Khmer Rouge by name, it enabled China, the group’s principal backer, to vote in favor, thus publicly committing itself to a democratic solution to Cambodia’s internal differences.' The 'resolution was carried by the widest margin since the Cambodia issue first came before the Assembly in 1978, with 124 countries voting in favor, 17 opposed and 12 abstaining. Last year a similar resolution won 122 votes, with 19 against and 13 abstentions. The reference to the "universally condemned policies and practices of the recent past" was placed in last year’s resolution in response to widespread fears that the Khmer Rouge might seize power this fall if Vietnam fulfilled its pledge to withdraw its forces from Cambodia.' Now Vietnam claims 'all its forces have gone', and fighting is 'increasing in Cambodia', there is now 'growing unease about the Khmer Rouge’s intentions'. The six members of ASEAN however, 'continue to contend that the Khmer Rouge must be brought into any comprehensive political settlement.' Notably, while Sweden and Finland 'voted for the resolution last year', they 'abstained today to protest the possibility of the Khmer Rouge’s returning to even partial power.'
'Officially, the Khmer Rouge says that Pol Pot and the other leaders responsible for its genocidal policies in Cambodia have retired from political life, and there are persistent reports that Pol Pot is seriously ill. Asian diplomats say Son Sann, who is prime minister in the opposition alliance, suggested to the Khmer Rouge that it send its most notorious leaders into exile. But the Khmer Rouge refused.'
1989_11_20 (Editorial Staff | P22/p01 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Monday 1989/11/20): On Cambodia: Immoral, and Pointless. 'Why won’t the world, even now, recognize reality in Cambodia?' 'The bloodiest little Southeast Asian country has seen its prospects transformed by two developments'. Sihanouk’s 'convoluted maneuvering toward a coalition collapsed' in August, and in September, 'Vietnamese troops ended their 10-year occupation. The pro-Vietnamese Hun Sen regime and Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge rebels now struggle in a desperate military showdown.' How does 'the world, including the Bush Administration, respond?' With 'policies conceived years ago which are worse than stagnant; they are repugnant', a 'tacit' 'cooperat[ion]' with the KR against Vietnam. But now they’re gone, and '[o]nly Hun Sen’s army stands' between the KR 'and their former killing fields. And that approach has become pointless as well as offensive.' A 'huge' UN 'majority, including the United States, shamefully endorsed a diplomatic formula that would invite Khmer Rouge killers into an interim Cambodian government' last week. 'To make this more palatable, the diplomats coupled their invitation with a polite warning against a return to the "universally condemned policies and practices of the recent past." The words "Khmer Rouge," "Pol Pot" and "genocide" were discreetly avoided. But no one should be fooled. The world community has decided to close its eyes to the real possibility of a second Cambodian holocaust.'
'Even as diplomats debated in New York, Khmer Rouge troops pressed their steady advance from sanctuaries along the Thai border toward Phnom Penh. On the battlefield, only two armies count: that of the Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen regime, and that of the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge. A third force, of non-Communist guerrillas backed by Asian countries and the U.S., plays only a spoiler’s role, distracting Hun Sen’s soldiers from the struggle against the Khmer Rouge. It’s understandable that non-Communist Southeast Asians are unhappy about a Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom Penh. And even now, long after the Vietnam War, many Americans still hope to contain Hanoi’s influence in Indochina. China is never reluctant to harry the pro-Soviet Vietnamese and further hopes to profit from its long investment in the Khmer Rouge.'
'Ever since Hanoi overthrew the Pol Pot regime in 1978, Washington has contended that resistance to the Vietnamese required some degree of cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, even though these killers murdered a million or more Cambodians. But the Vietnamese withdrawal and the diplomatic breakdown in Paris demolish any such justification. By refusing to break with the Khmer Rouge now, the non-Communist resistance has made itself Pol Pot’s pawn. The Hun Sen government still lacks legitimacy, but is clearly preferable to another round of Khmer Rouge killing. Some in Congress, and Southeast Asians like Thailand’s Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, now seem to recognize this point. But the U.N. majority, and the Bush Administration, still do not. Supervised free elections would be the ideal solution. But to insist, as does the U.N. resolution, on giving the Khmer Rouge an official role before the vote guarantees that there will be no elections. For now, the decisive contest for power is military. A Khmer Rouge victory, increasingly plausible, would be the worst imaginable outcome.'
1990_1_28 (Edith Milton ('who grew up in Germany and England, writes essays and short stories, many of them dealing with her experience of World War II.') | P80/p27 Book Review | Sunday 1990/1/28): THE DANGERS OF MEMORY; Book: TESTIMONY Contemporary Writers Make the Holocaust Personal. Edited by David Rosenberg (published 1/1/1989). 'The title of this essay collection, "Testimony: Contemporary Writers Make the Holocaust Personal," disconcerts me. It seems to suggest an almost gratuitous seeking out of intimacy with the horrendous, and to me it implies an odd sort of facile spiritual exercise, like those popularly applied during the Renaissance to the contemplation of martyrdom and other religious traumas. These 27 essays, edited by David Rosenberg, poet and essayist, are distant in space and time from Auschwitz, after all, and the offer to make the Holocaust personal by writers who for the most part had no direct experience of it seems, at first glance, simply arrogant.'
'Initially, the essays do not contradict the impression of being too easy in the face of too difficult a subject. All the essayists are Jewish; most live in America; and many are late converts from an earlier spiritual vacuum to what Robert Pinsky in his contribution calls a "religion of the Holocaust."' The first 10 odd essays aim to 'describe essentially the same process', a journey from childhood as a 'reluctant' Jew, to 'shocked awareness of the death camps, identification with their victims, and arrival, ultimately, at an understanding of what it means to be Jewish and at a commitment to Israel.' 'It is a repetition that makes for depressing reading; and when Jane DeLynn, with the nutty righteousness of an adolescent, declares that the continued existence of Israel is the single cause she feels may justify the use of nuclear weapons, one for which she might consider the annihilation of the rest of the world, one can only despair.' 'Fortunately', this is 'the low point' of 'what turns out to be an artful patchwork of contrasting opinions and personalities'. Perhaps too many, and too banal, 'Piligrims’ Progresses to Jewish identity, but in the aggregate these essays transcend the obvious paradox at the heart of any anthology that offers to recollect genocide in tranquillity'. Altogether, 'they add up, finally, to a useful compendium of the difficult disagreements in contemporary Jewish thought.'
He thinks even some essays 'are very good indeed, a handful brilliant; and that even the worst take pains to avoid the conventional and the academic'. 'Far from pretending to come to grips with the Holocaust, these narratives emphasize their authors’ necessary aloofness. Indeed, since subjectivity and obliqueness are the only approaches possible, this collection makes a virtue of being subjective and oblique. The best writing is often born of surprising and idiosyncratic viewpoints.' 'There is Julius Lester, a black American, a visionary, who, with great warmth and simplicity, destroys several of our most cherished moral divisions. "I am guilty," he says, "to the extent that I look at the Holocaust and insist on my innocence, for to be innocent is to deceive myself about what it means to be human." And there is Leslie Fiedler, who meditates with surprising charm on being the Last Jew and justifies "the last choice of the Chosen People: their decision to cease to exist in their chosenness for the sake of a united mankind."'
'Finally, there is Phillip Lopate’s admirably lucid and comprehensive "Resistance to the Holocaust," which declines to discuss the undiscussable and focuses instead on the abuses to which the idea of the Holocaust has been subjected, from denial that any such atrocity ever happened to the kitsch and sentimentality that have sprung up in its name. Mr. Lopate, unlike a majority of the other essayists included here, recognizes that many millions of people who were not Jews died in the Nazi camps, and that genocides occur all too frequently in the course of history. He points to the Holocaust as "the outer limit of a continuum of state-sanctioned cruelty," and marvels that we sometimes seem to treat "the murder of several million Cambodians as perhaps a more run-of-the-mill open-and-shut affair."' This essay 'makes a splendid center' for the book, due to its 'clarity of' 'argument and the resoluteness of its stance'. The collection’s value 'lies in variety'. 'It illustrates poignantly how individual prejudice and preference may lead people, on the same evidence, to vastly different conclusions and attitudes: to admire Hannah Arendt or despise her, to love Elie Wiesel or dismiss him, to be moved at Yad Vashem or dismayed by it. Perhaps it is not enough after all to remember history so as not to repeat its mistakes: memory is a biased tool that on occasion has driven events as tyrannically as forgetfulness. And the intensity of focus in "Testimony" sheds some light on how broad those biases may be.'
1990_2_18 (David Murray | P111/p24 Book Review | Sunday 1990/2/18): FICTION COMES TO THE KILLING FIELDS; Book: FOR THE SAKE OF ALL LIVING THINGS By John M. Del Vecchio (published 1990/2/1). 'Beginning in 1967, there has occurred in Cambodia an Asian holocaust in which, according to some estimates, more than three million Cambodians have died - casualties of civil war, political massacre, starvation, illness. Nor is peace at hand, even now.' On Vecchio’s first page, he asks '"How did it happen? What were the conditions and events that drove an unwitting people to the threshold of extinction? Was Cambodia a gentle land or the heart of darkness? A sideshow or an inextricable theater of the Southeast Asian war?"' To answer, he wrote a fictional story; an 11-year-old peasant Samnang conscripted into the KR, rising 'through brutal training and savage combat' to leadership. His sister Vathana marries a 'Frenchified heroin addict from Cambodia’s upper class'; working in hospitals, she 'meets and falls in love with an American Special Forces officer, John Sullivan, an adviser to the Cambodian military who has few illusions about that army’s - or indeed his own nation’s - ability to win.' Sullivan tells her that '"Cambodia needs international help." To which she replies: "America is very perplexing. You ask what will happen if we do nothing, but you think you do much just speaking."'
Del Vecchio believes the US 'lost the political will to pursue a victory', underlined through 'a number of literary devices', such as Sullivan chronicling events as background for his post-Army 1980s work at a Washington newspaper. For example, Sullivan hears Nixon’s tape announcing the invasion of Cambodia, and believes 'that by tipping the American hand Mr. Nixon doomed the invasion to failure'. For Sullivan, the '"most decisive battle"' was Kent State, when the National Guard killed four antiwar demonstrators. Del Vecchio himself served in Vietnam as a combat correspondent, and 'has thoroughly researched the military and civilian aspects of the Cambodian conflict. His narrative is filled with stark, bloody descriptive passages that detail Khmer Rouge training procedures, taking us to the Khmer Rouge’s sadistic re-education centers, which were established following their victory over the Cambodian Government. He also vividly depicts the hideous conditions of life in the country at large. Likewise, the carnage that followed the invasion of Cambodia by the North Vietnamese is set forth in a harrowing manner.'
'Mr. Del Vecchio’s opinions about America’s role in Cambodia can be debated; indeed, Cambodia’s tragic history has been the source of much controversy for the past 15 years. What cannot be debated is the power of Mr. Del Vecchio’s prose and the enormous amount of information he submits to his readers. He has added another memorable book to the literature of the Southeast Asian conflict, a tragic, bloody saga that seems to be with us forever.'
1990_2_22 (Steven Erlanger in Phnom Penh, Cambodia | P01 | Friday 1990/2/23): VIETNAMESE FORCE HELPING CAMBODIA, DIPLOMATS ASSERT - Defends Two Key Cities - Despite Pullout in Fall, Hanois Is Said to Heed Requests to Fight Khmer Rouge. 'Several thousand Vietnamese troops and military advisers returned to Cambodia last fall after a much-publicized withdrawal and are helping the Cambodian Government to defend two strategic cities from guerrilla attack, two senior Eastern European diplomats say.' They said Cambodia invited the Vietnamese back a month after departure was announced, indicating the 'precarious position of Cambodia’s Vietnamese-installed Government, which is under attack from the guerrillas of the Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian forces opposed to the Vietnamese influence.' Cambodia and Vietnam deny this; China, and the KR-lead anti-Vietnam alliance 'asserted that thousands of Vienamese troops never left.'
However, the Vietnamese ambassador in Cambodia, Ngo Dien, said there an undisclosed number of Vietnamese military commanders had returned at Phnom Penh’s request, for planning, training, and repairs. 'If Phnom Penh risked its international credibility by secretly inviting Vietnamese forces back, it clearly felt that the loss of additional territory to the Cambodian insurgents would create unacceptable morale and political problems. "On secret military matters, if the Cambodians need some people to advise or do something on a technical matter, we don’t say no," Mr. Dien said.' The 'two Eastern European diplomats' said the withdrawl went as promised, but after 'opposition advances' took Pailin, Hun Sen requested help, and Vietnam sent 'a special force as large as 3,000' to help at Battambang. 'The Vietnamese began to arrive by helicopter on Oct. 29, one of the diplomats said. At least 5,000 Vietnamese troops are encamped around Battambang and Sisophon to insure that these provincial capitals do not fall to the Khmer Rouge and its allied non-Communist factions, the two Eastern European diplomats said.' One said Vietnam told Hun Sen they would 'be withdrawn irrevocably' when the rainy season starts, 'around the end of April'.
'A third senior Eastern European diplomat said he had been told that at least 1,000 members of Vietnamese special forces entered Cambodia at the end of October, but he said he did not know if they were still here. "I know Vietnam wanted to be clean before Jakarta," he said, referring to the conference in Indonesia that is scheduled to begin later this month to discuss the future of Cambodia. "By now they might be gone."' But to his knowledge, 'they had done little fighting', the important thing was the KR knew they were there. He also said whether soldier or adviser, they were now '"paid for by Cambodia." Asked why he would disclose such sensitive and embarrassing information, a senior Eastern European diplomat with long experience here said, "I believe in the truth, and with changes at home, it is easier to tell it." Another Eastern European diplomat said Chinese, American and Southeast Asian aid was continuing to go to the opposition, "and it is no shame for Vietnam to respond to a request for help."'
'Dith Munty, Cambodia’s First Deputy Foreign Minister, said in an interview that there were no Vietnamese troops or military advisers here. Advised of Mr. Dien’s comments, he then said that "as far as I know, there are Vietnamese military attaches and aides working in Cambodia," but no troops.' He said the statements were '"a fabrication"', and Cambodia 'welcomed international verification'. Another Cambodian Foreign Ministry spokesman Chum Bun Rong concurred, saying if they were there, '"the Khmer Rouge could not seize a part of the country"'. '"We welcome verification by an international team even before a peace settlement. We don’t want to be hostage to accusations that poison the soil." Diplomats and aid workers say the Khmer Rouge control large areas of the countryside in a part circle beginning about 30 miles from the two city centers, where the three lines of defensive perimeters end. The Khmer Rouge have cut the Phnom Penh-Battambang rail line north of Pursat by blowing up two bridges, though Cambodian officials say they are under repair.'
The KR says their attack on Battambang began as 'frontal', but 'in fact the attacks were mostly made with rockets. Troops did not penetrate the city’s suburbs.' 'Foreign journalists were not allowed to visit Battambang until Jan. 23 and found the city quiet. But they flew into the city on a special flight and were not allowed to travel around the city, except to drive north to Sisophon and Poipet, within the defensive perimeters. Aid workers and diplomats say that about 12,000 Cambodians displaced by the fighting are now living on the streets of Battambang and that 30 people a day reach the city hospital with gunshot wounds.'
'The Vietnamese withdrawal last September followed a nearly 11-year occupation that began with their expulsion in January 1979 of the Khmer Rouge Government, under which more than a million Cambodians died. Before the withdrawal in September, Vietnamese generals said they feared that Sisophon and Battambang might fall. If those cities are taken, Cambodian officials privately say they fear a collapse of already low army morale and a panic in Phnom Penh. Early last April, when Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos jointly announced that Vietnamese troops would leave Cambodia at the end of September, the declaration included a clause reserving to Cambodia the right to call on assistance again if needed.' Hanoi said such a request would be judged 'at the time', but didn’t want to re-enter, but instead, to build relations with 'the West, the United States in particular, which had made Vietnam’s withdrawal a condition of diplomatic and commercial relations.'
'But the United States said that the unilateral Vietnamese withdrawal was not sufficient, and that normalization could only come after a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. An American embargo on aid and trade to Vietnam continues, and Washington has blocked loans to Vietnam from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank.'
'The Eastern European diplomats said Mr. Hun Sen’s Government had been shocked by the fall of Pailin (one also said Hun Sen initially refused '"the military lobby"'’s request for help after initial failures, but the fall of Pailin changed his mind; and that the 3k Vietnamese were 'elite career soldiers who had not served in Cambodia'). In Hanoi, Maj. Gen. Tran Cong Man confirmed in an interview that Cambodian forces abandoned Pailin "with no real reason" when they thought Khmer Rouge forces were about to surround them.' He said such behavior would have lead to a general’s death sentence; in another town, Cambodian troops 'left' when their commander was injured. He also denied there were Vietnamese fighting in Cambodia, 'but said that the Cambodian Army suffered from poor morale and weak leadership.'
1990_3_16 (AP in Athens, Georgia, USA | P50/p01 Television | Saturday 1990/3/17): Broadcasting Awards Given For Coverage of Disasters. Among other awards for various topics: 'Central Independent Television, London, for ""Cambodia Year 10," an examination of "the plight of the nation from the Pol Pot regime to its tenuous present."'
1990_3_24 (Steven Erlanger in Bangkok, Thailand | P01 | Sunday 1990/3/25): Thai Wants Cambodia Refugees in Neutral Camps. 'The Thai Prime Minister has proposed moving about 276,000 displaced Cambodians from existing border camps to neutral ones free of political control by the warring Cambodian factions. The idea has been widely hailed by humanitarian groups and the European Community.' PM Chatichai’s outline ('first made two weeks ago') likely wouldn’t 'become a reality', 'Thai officials, Western diplomats and relief workers say.'. Criticism 'has come from many quarters, including the Thai military and, indirectly, the United States. Washington has little desire to see the faltering non-Communist guerrilla factions damaged further by the loss of the camps.' Even IRAs think his motive is 'more political than humanitarian', as it 'would only benefit the Vietnamese-installed Government in Phnom Penh'. Chatichai has drawn closer with Hun Sen to 'foster trade and end the war', and there are complaints about 'the burden of the Cambodian refugees. An increasing number say it is time that they are repatriated and that Thailand stop providing sanctuaries to the Cambodian opposition. The military, in particular, opposes another large refugee camp on Thai soil.'
All six camps in question get aid from the UNBRO, and some ICRC protection, are administered by the three rebel factions - 'the Communist Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front and the followers of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The last two groups are non-Communist and receive about $30 million a year in open and secret American aid.'. Though 'officially civilian', the camps 'in fact assist the armies' (recruits, food, combatant housing), and are 'in part as guerrilla bases in Thai territory, where Cambodian and Vietnamese troops cannot follow.'
'Residents of the camps, who originally fled the fighting in Cambodia in the late 1970’s [how about during the DK?], when the Khmer Rouge were ousted by the Vietnamese, have never had free choice about which camp they prefer, or under which leadership they wish to live. Residents of all the camps, but especially the Khmer Rouge ones, are subject to demands for military service and the portering of ammunition to the front. In the sprawling Liberation Front camp called Site 2, they are also subject to theft and extortion.' Hence, Thailand and 'groups like' the IRC, RI, and the USCR have 'long ... urged' neutral UN-administered camps. 'But for those politically opposed to Mr. Hun Sen, this is not the time to establish neutral camps. With the non-Communist factions suffering reverses on the battlefield, the elimination of their sanctuaries and the removal of camp populations from their control would damage them considerably, Western diplomats say.'
'The Liberation Front in particular, which has been the target of Phnom Penh's most recent advance in northwest Cambodia, is now in great difficulty, the diplomats say. The so-called liberated zone that the front carved out in northwest Cambodia, into which it eventually intended to move the refugees under its control, has largely been retaken by Phnom Penh. "For the K.P.N.L.F., the closing of Site 2 would be a disaster," a Western diplomat said.' While making no 'public declaration' on the proposal, in meetings 'last week' with the Thai Interior Minister, the US Ambassador Daniel O’Donohue 'repeated the American position that the safety and well-being of the camp population should be preserved. But Mr. O’Donohue also asked the Thais to consider the expense and difficulties of the proposal, Thai officials and Western diplomats said, especially at a time when United Nations agencies involved are having severe budget shortfalls. "Of course the Americans oppose it on political grounds, but they don’t have to say so," a Thai official said. "They just have to point out the obvious difficulties."'
'One of the American concerns, also shared by relief workers, is that the building of a neutral camp would merely encourage the Cambodian factions to move their camp populations over the border into Cambodia so as not to lose control over them. This sort of unsupervised and forcible repatriation across a mine-laced military front would create more danger for the refugees than leaving them where they are, a relief worker said. The Khmer Rouge has already moved about 15,000 people out of United Nations-supervised camps in the last 18 months, most recently in late January, officials say.'
1990_4_30 (Robert Pear in Washington DC | P13/A13 | Tuesday 1990/5/1): U.S. Says China Sent Large Arms Supplies to Khmer Rouge - Beijing is praised for supplying the non-Communists with weapons. 'In defiance of numerous requests from the Bush Administration, China has recently sent large new shipments of weapons to Khmer Rouge guerrillas battling the Cambodian Government, Administration officials say.' Bush’s NSAd and DSoS Lawrence S. Eagleburger visited Beijing 'in July and December', and 'asked the Chinese to curtail military support for the Khmer Rouge. More than a million Cambodians died under Khmer Rouge rule, from 1975 through 1978, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The United States has repeatedly said the Khmer Rouge must never return to power. In a confidential report to Congress this month, the State Department said there had been no discernible decrease in Chinese arms deliveries to the Khmer Rouge over the last six months. Indeed, Administration officials said the quantity and quality of the weapons had increased as fighting in Cambodia intensified.'
Policy Setback for Bush
'The last seven months have seen the heaviest fighting in Cambodia since 1985, when Vietnamese soldiers pushed many guerrillas over the border from Cambodia into Thailand. The Chinese have been arming the Khmer Rouge for years. But the discovery of large new arms shipments represents a setback for Mr. Bush’s policy and is the latest example of the failure of United States attempts to change Chinese behavior through the Scowcroft missions. ABC News reported on Thursday that American aid to non-Communist Cambodian guerrillas had the effect of helping the Khmer Rouge because they cooperate on the battlefield. But the Administration has said sees "no pattern of cooperation."' A Bush official said China was '"thumbing their nose"' at the US, 'as on other issues like human rights and the case of the dissident Fang Lizhi', the latter given 'refuge at the American Embassy in Beijing since June. The Chinese authorities have issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of organizing the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square last spring, and Beijing has spurned American requests to let him leave the country.'
The USSD quoted China saying they’ll end their aid when Vietnam’s withdrawl is '"independently verified, when all other external assistance to the Cambodian factions ceases and when a comprehensive settlement is in place." Mr. Eagleburger said the United States had urged China, "in any number of forums on a number of different occasions," to reduce and preferably to end its military support for the Khmer Rouge, even in the absence of a political settlement. French, Soviet and Thai diplomats said they saw no chance of such a settlement in the near future. Even while criticizing China for arming the Khmer Rouge, Administration officials said they were grateful to Beijing for supplying weapons to two non-Communist Cambodian guerrilla groups supported by Washington. The non-Communist factions are led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann, a former Prime Minister of Cambodia. "We encourage China" to continue supplying the non-Communist factions, an Administration official said, adding, "The non-Communist resistance would be vulnerable if it were not armed."'
'American officials said Chinese military aid to the Khmer Rouge far exceeds that to the other guerrilla factions. The Phnom Penh Government has received large amounts of weapons, including tanks, from the Soviet Union and Vietnam. China and the other permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, have held three rounds of talks this year in an effort to arrange a cease-fire and a framework for a political settlement in Cambodia. But a State Department official said the Chinese "need to display more flexibility" for the talks to succeed. A professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lucian W. Pye, said the Chinese leaders who suppressed the democracy movement last year were "obsessed with the need for stability" inside China and were now subordinating foreign policy to that goal.'
'Washington openly provides the non-Communist Cambodian guerrillas with food, medicine, clothing and money. Critics of Administration policy, including some in Congress, say the non-Communist guerrillas have used American aid funds to buy arms in Thailand or from Singapore. They also assert that American aid to the non-Communist guerrillas indirectly benefits their coalition partner, the Khmer Rouge. A State Department spokesman, Adam M. Shub, said on Friday: "We have no indication at all that any of the assistance we’ve provided to the non-Communists has been turned over to the Khmer Rouge. We provide no arms. We provide only nonlethal assistance to the non-Communist resistance." But battlefield reports sent to the Pentagon from the American Embassy in Thailand give details of increasingly close cooperation and "joint military operations" conducted by the Khmer Rouge and the non-Communist factions. In the last two months, the reports say, Khmer Rouge guerrillas and their non-Communist allies have stepped up joint operations in northwestern and central Cambodia, and Prince Sihanouk has said his troops fight "side by side" with the Khmer Rouge.'
1990_5_04 (Anthony Lewis | P35/p02 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Friday 1990/5/4): (Abroad at Home) The Killing Fields - Shameless U.S. policy on Cambodia. 'Suppose a Nazi army had stayed intact at the end of World War II, and held out in a remote area with Hitler, Goering and Himmler. Then imagine an American Government insisting that the Nazis must be included in arrangements for a German political settlement.' This is 'something like' what the US is doing in Cambodia today, 'benefit[ing] the murderous' KR. 'When the Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia, from 1975 to 1978, they killed at least a million people. It is the one episode since the Nazi holocaust that qualifies for the term genocide.†'
'The Khmer Rouge leadership survives intact, with an army of 40,000, in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. Pol Pot, the murderer-in-chief, is still there, directing the Khmer Rouge in its war on the Vietnamese-backed Government of Cambodia. A report last week by the human rights group Asia Watch showed that the Khmer Rouge are still using familiar methods. Refugees are forced to carry military equipment into Cambodia through areas planted with land mines. Those who refuse are denied food. Asia Watch interviewed children aged 11, 13 and 14 who had been made to act as military porters.' China supplies the KR, to 'carry on its millennial struggle with Vietnam', and Thailand is the willing conduit. 'The United States has helped the Khmer Rouge diplomatically by keeping them in Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations. It has put no pressure on Thailand, a good friend, to cut the arms flow. The U.S. insists that any political settlement in Cambodia must include a transitional role for three parties in addition to the present government: two tiny non-Communist opposition groups and the Khmer Rouge. In effect, that means recognition of the Khmer Rouge.'
'The way American policy works in the Khmer Rouge interest was explored last week in a superb television documentary, an ABC News special with Peter Jennings as anchor, "From the Killing Fields." It said that arms supplied by the U.S. to the non-Communist opposition have made their way to the Khmer Rouge.' While the USSD says they only send '"nonlethal" materiel' and denies helping the KR, but even if there aren’t 'secretly' weapons, the material 'include[s] guerrilla boats and combat gear'; and the KR 'dominate the so-called opposition coalition. There was some revealing reaction to the Jennings program. A review in The Wall Street Journal attacked it in McCarthyite terms as pro-Vietnamese. President Bush’s press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, endorsed the Journal attack.'
'That reaction showed one reason for an American policy that on its face seems inexplicable. That reason is sheer hostility to Vietnam, a resentment that has continued to burn since the end of the Vietnam War.' Thus, US officials 'seem almost to forget the' KR 'record'. 'When the latest conference attempting to arrange a Cambodian settlement broke up, the United States blamed Vietnam for insisting on using the word "genocide" in reference to recent history.' 'Some Americans who have reason to remember the war bitterly take a more rational view', such as Senator John McCain, a Hanoi POW for six years, 'urges reconciliation'. 'William Colby, the former Director of Central Intelligence, who has published a book defending what the U.S. did during the war, appeared on the Jennings program to criticize our Cambodia policy now.'
'The other major explanation for the policy is China. From the President down, the Bush Administration seems determined to do nothing that might offend China. That evidently includes nothing effective against the Khmer Rouge.' He notes Bush asked China to 'cut down' KR military support, but 'this week it was reported' these have actually increased. 'The Administration and those in Congress who share responsibility for the policy - particularly, and surprisingly, Representative Stephen Solarz‡ of New York - seem to believe that they can somehow detach themselves from the consequences. But if the mass murderers take power again in Phnom Penh, Washington’s role will not be forgotten.'
Comments: † it’s interesting he says this is 'the one episode' since the Holocaust that 'qualifies for the term genocide'; there were many others, and this one doesn’t actually qualify. ‡ It seems Solarz (Democrat) ran an anti-war campaign in 1966 for a US House seat (though apparently lost); he seemed critical of some of Reagan’s interventionism, such as in Lebanon. He was also Jewish (his Wiki didn’t say his thoughts on Israel, but if he was a Zionist, that might explain it). Perhaps Lewis is 'surprised' by Solarz, since he makes the Holocaust comparison to the KR in this article.
1990_5_07 (Editorial Board | P14/p01 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Monday 1990/5/7): Ignored: A Path to Peace in Cambodia. 'In the waning days of the Vietnam War, President Nixon ordered American troops into Cambodia. He said it was necessary lest the United States be seen as "a pitiful, helpless giant." That invasion 20 years ago helped bring the Khmer Rouge to power and turn Cambodia into a killing field. Today, President Bush acts as though the U.S. were a pitiful, helpless giant in Cambodia - and a confused one at that. He insists that he wants peace between the Vietnamese-backed Government in Phnom Penh and anti-Vietnamese guerrillas. Yet he does little but complain about the failure of Beijing and Prince Sihanouk, the nominal anti-Vietnamese leader, to heed his requests. The President talks as though he wanted to end the nightmare inflicted by Khmer Rouge forces. Yet he praises China for supplying their non-Communist allies. This amounts to more Chinese arms for the Khmer Rouge.'
While peace will be difficult, the 'fundamental failure is one of policy'; in Washington, this is being 'more interested in fighting a phantom war with Vietnam than in seeking peace in Cambodia. If Mr. Bush really wants to stop the Khmer Rouge, he needn’t depend on Beijing or Prince Sihanouk. There’s now a chance to choke the arms pipeline - in Thailand. Cambodia’s present Government was installed by Vietnamese troops in 1979. Successive American Administrations have been willing to go to virtually any lengths to deny Hanoi further triumphs. Now the U.S. refuses to recognize that Vietnamese forces have withdrawn from Cambodia. Doing so would acknowledge that the U.S. is helping to sustain a civil war, not a resistance movement.' Bush says he wants a 'political settlement', but the true test is if he chokes the arms conduits the rebels 'need to sustain the war'. 'Geography dictates' the only route is via Thailand, and Thai PM Chatichai has 'repeatedly signaled' he wants peace (for the economy); yet the 'Thai armed forces that control the supply routes have shown no enthusiasm for their Prime Minister’s peace plans. A clear U.S. position in favor of squeezing the arms flows could change their minds.'
'Oh, we can’t do that, the Administration would say. That would also choke off arms to the non-Communist guerrillas. That’s true, but so what? Peace can only come to Cambodia through serious diplomacy and there won’t be any while the guns keep flowing to the Khmer Rouge murderers. Only by calling on Thailand to halt the arms supply can the U.S. begin to exorcise the ghosts of Vietnam for itself, and for Cambodians.'
1990_5_10 (Joel R. Charny and Anne E. Goldfeld | P33/p02 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Thursday 1990/5/10): Cambodia: Don’t Look Away. 'With each passing day of political stalemate, the human toll in Cambodia escalates. After surviving mass murder and slave labor under Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, Cambodians both within the country and in encampments along the Thai border continue to suffer in silence. With the intensification of war, the growing strength of the Khmer Rouge and the repeated failure of negotiations, there is an urgent need for the international community to formulate a humanitarian response.' Cambodians in Cambodia 'struggle to build new lives'. 'In rural areas, widows who lost husbands under Pol Pot cannot produce enough food to feed their families. Irrigation pumps essential for rice production lie unused for lack of spare parts. These have been blocked by the U.S.-supported international trade and aid embargo against Cambodia. Draft animals die because of shortages of vaccines. In Battambang Province in western Cambodia, once the country’s rice bowl, hundreds of hectares of rich agricultural land have been taken out of production by land mines and war.'
'In Phnom Penh, residents crowd into tiny apartments or live in makeshift houses in rat-infested slums. Water and sewage systems, built by the French in 1905, barely function. Hospitals are poorly equipped and grossly understaffed - a legacy of the Khmer Rouge era, when most trained medical personnel were killed. One in five children dies before the age of 5. To escape military conscription, students risk cerebral malaria fleeing through jungles to Thai border jails. Those who do fight find themselves in a war in which, once again, Cambodians are killing Cambodians.' 'On the Thai border, in an active war zone, 278,000 people are held behind barbed wire in encampments.' Factions control these, and '[a]fter 10 years' of war, 'these people are still denied the refugee status that would enable them to find asylum. Many wish to return home but they cannot safely do so. Despite the best efforts by relief agencies, there is often not enough food, water or bamboo in the camps. People risk eyesight, limbs and their lives foraging for something salable or edible in the minefields. As a Cambodian has said, "You will recognize the Cambodian of the future by his one leg."'
'After 20 years of war and at least two million deaths by violence and famine, there is clearly no military solution for Cambodia. Too many times in this conflict political agendas have taken precedence over the alleviation of human suffering. Too many times in this century, the international community has failed to act.' They urge a 'humanitarian agenda for the Cambodian people', including immediate cease-fire, neutral UN-protected camps, its members having 'freedom to choose repatriation to Cambodia or asylum'; end of the UN embargo on 'development assistance to Cambodia so that, in advance of a political settlement, basic needs can begin to be met.'; recognizing the KR genocide and an international tribunal.
'For those Cambodians who have died by starvation or mine injury it is too late. For those who have lived in poverty, without safety or human rights, it has been far too long, but is not yet too late. We cannot alter the past. But together with the Cambodian people, we can begin to bind the wounds and help make 1990 a year of new life. As John Dos Passos wrote in 1940, in the midst of another Holocaust, "our only hope will lie in the frail web of understanding of one person for the pain of another."'
1990_5_25 (Editorial Board | P26/p01 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Friday 1990/5/25): Half Right on China Trade. Bush is 'right to propose renewing China's trade privileges. But he would have sent a sounder message if he had expressed outrage over Beijing’s continued gross abuse of human rights. Congress, which has 30 days to review the proposal, again will have to make clear that approving it in no sense approves repression. For now, the trade privileges, known as most-favored-nation status, should continue. Suspension would be the wrong way to support the democratic cause in China. It would most injure the wrong Chinese, the urban constituencies that still favor economic and political reform. Over the long pull, it is in America’s interest to strengthen these groups through trade and political support.'
While suspension might hurt 'Beijing’s hard-line leadership'’s 'prestige', but 'U.S. displeasure can be delivered more directly to these leaders - by strong statement of U.S. condemnation - without damaging the forces of democracy.' 'Recent changes' in Soviet and PRC policy give Bush an opportunity to re-evaluate a range of Asia-Pacific policies; 'He needs to take a firmer stance against Chinese arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and advanced weapons sales to the Middle East. Until China stops these activities and improves its human rights performance, he should maintain restrictions on World Bank loans and military sales to China. China recently released more than 200 political prisoners to encourage renewal of trade privileges. It can’t hurt to make it clear to Beijing that future renewals won’t be automatic, and that fresh provocations could bring swift revocation. The White House took precisely the wrong tack by emphasizing the profits American business stands to gain from renewal. President Bush’s decision to favor renewal of equal trading status for China was half right. Now it’s up to Congress to press for the second half - a ringing commitment to human and civil rights for the Chinese people.'
1990_5_29 (Representative Stephen J. Solarz ('Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs') | P20/p01 Letters to the Editor | Tuesday 1990/6/12): Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Won’t Go Away. 'In "The Killing Fields" (column, May 4), Anthony Lewis asserts that I support a policy that diplomatically and militarily "benefits the murderous Khmer Rouge," and that I am trying to detach myself from the consequences of such an approach. As someone who has devoted much of the last 15 years first to exposing Pol Pot’s genocide and then to frustrating its repetition, I believe he does me an injustice.'
'Mr. Lewis begins, disapprovingly, with an analogy to the inclusion of hypothetical remnant Nazis in post-World War II Germany in a hypothetical political settlement. If he suggests that the United States is insisting on Khmer Rouge inclusion in an interim government, he is nine months out of date. At last year’s Paris conference on Cambodia, the United States did endorse such an idea (a proposal I opposed). Since last year, however, the Bush Administration has supported an Australian proposal for a United Nations-supervised interim administration, the primary purpose of which is to exclude the Khmer Rouge. If, on the other hand, Mr. Lewis advocates that the Khmer Rouge should not be allowed to compete in elections in Cambodia, he ignores that even Hun Sen is willing to permit Khmer Rouge participation in an internationally supervised election, which the Khmer Rouge will certainly lose. In any case, it is hard to believe that the Khmer Rouge would be willing to go along with an agreement that includes elections from which they would be barred.'
'Regrettably, the Khmer Rouge can be constrained but not wished away. To return to the Nazi analogy, if there had been units of Hitler’s holdouts in some Bavarian redoubt, the occupation armies of the four powers would have dealt with them. Because no country seems prepared to send its forces to Cambodia to fight the Khmer Rouge, we must seek a political settlement. The most Cambodia could otherwise hope for is to become a Southeast Asian Lebanon.'
'Mr. Lewis also appears to endorse the notion that United States non-lethal assistance to non-Communist Cambodian forces is ending up in the hands of the Khmer Rouge. As the author of a statutory prohibition against any aid directly or indirectly benefiting the Khmer Rouge, I would be the first to object if such diversions were occurring. Yet I do not, because no diversions have occurred. That the non-Communists sit with the Khmer Rouge in a paper coalition for purposes of United Nations politics means nothing in Cambodia, where each military faction essentially fights on its own.'
'There is no question that the Khmer Rouge present a danger to the people of Cambodia. Preventing Pol Pot from returning to power should be the top priority of our policy. Yet the best way of dealing with the reality of the Khmer Rouge is to get a comprehensive settlement that would end the fighting, restore Cambodia’s national independence† and permit an election free of Khmer Rouge intimidation. That is the type of settlement the United States is attempting to secure.'
Comments: † It’s interesting he is claiming Cambodia is not independent.
1990_6_03 (Editorial Board | P171/p01 Editorials, Letters, and Opinions | Sunday 1990/6/3): Beijing’s Bloody Thank You. 'President Bush knew he’d draw criticism at home for proposing, despite Beijing’s violations of basic human rights, a 12-month renewal of China’s commercial access to U.S. markets. But in return he must surely have expected gestures of reconciliation and good will. Instead, Beijing’s answer is cynical and cruel: kind words for Mr. Bush and new repression for its suffering people.' It makes sense to 'keep trade doors open to sustain China’s reform-minded export regions'. But his 'frustrating refusal' to 'tough talk' has 'again backfired', 'adding fresh fuel to domestic criticism and setting back human rights in China. Tomorrow’s first anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre is the perfect occasion for Mr. Bush to stop mincing words.'
'Until the President’s May 24 announcement, Beijing worked hard to improve its image. It released political prisoners, lifted martial law in Tibet and revived talk of economic reform. But once Mr. Bush came out for renewal, China changed its tune. Prisoners were rearrested for minor offenses. Executions resumed. China bullied neighboring states into preventing political broadcasts from the Goddess of Democracy, a ship in international waters.'
Despite PRC tough talk, 'a decade of economic reform' has made them 'more sensitive to international opinion', it can’t 'afford to ignore outsiders'. 'Humanitarian arguments may not move Beijing to treat its people decently but commercial arguments can. That confers powerful leverage on the U.S. Yet Mr. Bush has refused to use it, even after the harsh responses to his conciliatory approach. Conversely, China’s concern about possible suspension of its U.S. trade privileges brought modest concessions. For now, continuing those privileges remains the best way to encourage Chinese democracy -but not indefinitely or unconditionally. Congress has 30 days to review Mr. Bush’s decision. It can make a constructive contribution by going along with this year’s extension but making it plain to the Chinese that America insists on demonstrable human rights and foreign policy progress before consenting to future extensions.'
'That progress should include a full accounting of all remaining political prisoners, freedom of emigration and the ending of arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia as well as advanced weapons to the Middle East. Beijing’s insulting responses to Mr. Bush require response, and not just by Congress. The Administration needs to spell out what will be needed to sustain longer-term economic cooperation. Mr. Bush is the right spokesman, and the Tiananmen anniversary is the right time.'
1990_6_04 (Steven Erlanger in Tokyo, Japan | P10/A10 | Tuesday 1990/6/5): Cambodia Talks Quickly Collapse With Boycott by the Khmer Rouge. 'A new round of talks on Cambodia lasted only 25 minutes today after the Khmer Rouge guerrillas complained about their representation here and boycotted the session.' This 'annoyed their Japanese hosts, who are engaged in regional peacemaking for the first time since the end of World War II.' Japan said they’re trying to salvage the talks 'intended to normalize a symbolic agreement already initialed by all four Cambodian factions.' 'The talks went into recess after the representative of the Khmer Rouge, Khieu Samphan, did not show up for the morning session'. The KR said they wnated to 'take part as an equal in four-party talks', rather than be part of one of two 'rival governments in Cambodia'.
'Prince Sihanouk had agreed to represent his side, with Mr. Khieu Samphan and Mr. Son Sann as part of his delegation, while Prime Minister Hun Sen represents the Vietnamese-installed Government in Phnom Penh. Mr. Khieu Samphan’s agreement to attend as only part of Prince Sihanouk’s delegation was considered a significant concession by the Khmer Rouge and their Chinese allies. It pleased the Americans, too, because it made the Khmer Rouge, who dominate the battlefield against Mr. Hun Sen, seem subsidiary to the non-Communist Prince Sihanouk.' 'The Japanese diplomat in charge of Southeast Asian affairs, Masaharu Kohno, said tonight that he was not entirely surprised by the Khmer Rouge boycott, "since they have done similar things on other occasions." But the Japanese were visibly upset.' The KR have thus 'insure[d] they are not forgotten'. Sihanouk is now in a 'difficult position, highlighting the weakness of his position. If he proceeds, as promised, to continue talking to Mr. Hun Sen and to sign the agreement already worked out, the Khmer Rouge say they will not abide by it. But if he does not proceed, he displays how much he is beholden to them.'
'That is why, in previous conversations with Mr. Hun Sen, the Prince has stressed that he was acting for his own faction only. Here, however, he is supposed to be representing his coalition. The agreement also calls for the establishment of a supreme national council to represent Cambodian sovereignty after a settlement and before new elections. In the agreement, the council is two-sided, with six members each for the two rival governments, rather than equal representation for all four factions.' The US wants modifications, 'calling for a comprehensive settlement and a stronger role in monitoring a cease-fire and cessation of foreign military aid by the United Nations. But there was little discussion of any changes today. As Japanese, Thai and even Chinese Embassy officials tried to persuade the Khmer Rouge to return to the talks, Prince Sihanouk said he was not returning to them himself because he agreed with the proposed text and had "nothing to discuss." "The problem is with the Khmer Rouge," he said.'
1990_6_05 (Steven Erlanger in Tokyo, Japan | P03 | Wednesday 1990/6/6): SIHANOUK WIDENS KHMER ROUGE RIFT - Signs Pact With Phnom Penh Government in Defiance of Communist Faction. 'Responding to the concerns of his Western backers, Prince Norodom Sihanouk distanced himself further from the Communist Khmer Rouge today, signing a communique with Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, that the Khmer Rouge refused to support. Speaking alongside his non-Communist ally, Son Sann, Prince Sihanouk said the two men and their followers would abide by the terms of the communique, even though their allies, the Khmer Rouge, would not do so.'
'The statement calls for the establishment of a Supreme National Council by the end of July to embody Cambodian sovereignty until new elections can be held and a new government formed. The communique says the council will be made up of equal numbers of representatives from the two rival governments, as Mr. Hun Sen wishes - not of equal numbers from the four Cambodian factions, as the Khmer Rouge demands. The communique also calls for "voluntary self-restraint on the use of force" - diplomatic language for a cease-fire that cannot be enforced -beginning on the first day that the Supreme National Council meets.' But Sihanouk said a ceasefire required KR agreement, and that 'the Supreme National Council would not truly be representative of Cambodian sovereignty until the Khmer Rouge took part.' '"But in my opinion, the Supreme National Council will really be a symbol of sovereignty only on the day the Khmer Rouge join as full members. In order to have peace in Cambodia, we need to make peace with the Khmer Rouge. We must persuade the Khmer Rouge to join us inside the Supreme Council."'
Pressure Off Western Nations
'But if the Prince and Mr. Son Sann do what they have now promised to do -form a Supreme National Council with Mr. Hun Sen even without the participation of the Khmer Rouge - it will enable the United Nations this fall to give Cambodia’s seat there to the council, thereby further legitimizing Mr. Hun Sen and isolating the Khmer Rouge.' This would ease pressure on the US 'and other Western governments that have been increasingly criticized for indirectly supporting the Khmer Rouge by their support for the Prince and Mr. Son Sann.' Currently, 'the Sihanouk coalition which includes the Khmer Rouge' has Cambodia’s seat. The KR 'were driven out of power when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in 1978. Under the Khmer Rouge, more than a million Cambodians were killed or died of starvation and disease during a brutal campaign of restructuring. But as the Prince implied tonight, such an pact is likely to do little to end the war in Cambodia, the brunt of which is carried by the Khmer Rouge, and may intensify the fighting.' Left out of a settlement, they’ll 'have little incentive to stop fighting, and Asian and European diplomats make clear that no country will agree to put international peacekeeping troops into Cambodia as long as the Khmer Rouge have not agreed in principle, at least, to lay down their arms.' Japan opened the conference 'confidently', based on a draft from Thai Defense Minister Gen. Chavalit, which all four factions had signed.
'Japanese officials spoke of the meeting as a first venture into regional peacemaking since the end of World War II, and as a diplomatic exercise more commensurate with Japan's standing as a world economic power.' yet it 'quickly turned sour', and since the KR boycott, the 'bipartite negotiations never resumed'. General Chavalit and Japanese officials 'spent most of their time in conversation with the Khmer Rouge and the Sihanouk side. Officials with Mr. Hun Sen said there was little for them to do but wait.'
'A joint Hun Sen-Sihanouk news conference turned into separate ones, and then it was announced that Mr. Hun Sen would not speak this evening after all. Throughout, Japanese officials tried to keep smiles on their faces, although one official said the Japanese were "very annoyed" with the Cambodians, the Khmer Rouge in particular. In the end, what Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Hun Sen signed tonight was a communique little different from the one that the four factions initialed last month. But the real importance of the meeting here is likely to be the growing isolation of the Khmer Rouge within a diplomatic process that is accelerating, and that is treating Mr. Hun Sen with much more respect than before.'
1990_6_14 (Reed Irvine in Washington DC ('Chairman, Accuracy in Media') | P137/p01 Letters to the Editor | Sunday 1990/6/24): Accuracy in Media Has Enviable Record. 'In 1981, Robert MacNeil of the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour said that he had found that "the public is entirely justified in thinking that a lot of American journalism is unfair or inaccurate." He said he used to "laugh those complaints away as conservative paranoia," but he had discovered that a program that tries to present many sides of controversial issues "reaps an extraordinary harvest of public gratitude."'
'It is ironic that your television writer Walter Goodman should have spent 21 column inches [Critic’s Notebook, May 28; see also Arts & Leisure, June 17, and letter, June 17] discussing an attack by the far-left group FAIR on Mr. MacNeil’s program. This small group has attracted inordinate news media attention for criticisms of the few programs on television that make an honest effort to give diverse points of view a hearing. FAIR wants more time given to the extremists on the left, to that numerically insignificant group that used to regard Pol Pot as a Cambodian hero and who wept at the rejection of Daniel Ortega by the people of Nicaragua.' He 'label[ed] Accuracy in Media the counterpart of FAIR on the right', that 'we are "advancing views that originate on the farther edges of America’s political spectrum"', '[un]interested in accuracy'. Yet the group for 20 years has 'an enviable record for accuracy in criticism', and has 'attracted thousands of American mainstream supporters'. 'At our 20th anniversary celebration last year, we received letters of commendation from President Bush, Ronald Reagan, Richard Nixon and many other prominent Americans.'
'AIM has often criticized the news media for portraying Communism as a system good for its victims and covering up Communist crimes. Perhaps that is why Mr. Goodman, caught in a pre-glasnost time warp, placed us on the farther edges of America’s political spectrum.'
1990_6_20 (Kenton J. Clymer in El Paso, Texas ('Professor of History, U. of Texas') | P16/p01 Letters to the Editor | Tuesday 1990/7/3): More Than One Way to Aid Khmer Rouge. 'Representative Stephen J. Solarz (letter, June 12) takes issue with Anthony Lewis’s assertion that Mr. Solarz supports a United States policy toward Cambodia that "benefits the murderous Khmer Rouge." Though I have no doubt that Representative Solarz does not want to see a return of the Khmer Rouge (he has spoken forcefully and eloquently on this in the last decade), the policies he advocates toward Cambodia have the effect of strengthening the Khmer Rouge.'
'Since at least 1983, Mr. Solarz has strongly supported sending American military assistance to the Khmer Rouge’s non-Communist allies. Although his efforts have not been successful, overt nonlethal aid has been authorized since 1985, and considerably more covert assistance has probably reached the resistance groups. Even if Mr. Solarz is correct that no American aid intended for these forces has reached the Khmer Rouge (and there have been persistent reports to the contrary), such aid indirectly helps the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge’s non-Communist allies use American assistance to combat the government in Phnom Penh. As far as they succeed in weakening the Phnom Penh Government, the Khmer Rouge - the strongest of the resistance factions - benefits.' He notes Solarz’ diplomatic support of the rebel coalition, representing Cambodia at the UN, 'though it controls very little territory. In fact, Khmer Rouge officials represent Cambodia at the United Nations.' These undermine the Hun Sen govt, which 'has its shortcomings, it is infinitely preferable to the Khmer Rouge regime that it replaced in 1979 and is strongly opposed to the return of the murderers. Weakening it - by supplying groups that are engaged in combat against it or by denying it diplomatic status - benefits the Khmer Rouge.'
1990_7_07 (Clifford Krauss in Washington DC | P03 | Sunday 1990/7/8): U.S. Weighs a Shift on Cambodia Policy - Critics say the current practice really benefits the Khmer Rouge. 'The Bush Administration is beginning quietly to reconsider its policy of supporting a guerrilla insurgency against the Vietnamese-backed Government of Cambodia, officials say', though not 'full-fledged policy review', Congressional pressure, and 'developments on the battlefield' and at negotiations, could 'force other options, including contacts with Phnom Penh or withdrawal from the conflict altogether.' 'Washington is giving more than $15 million a year in covert and overt aid to two small non-Communist guerrilla groups fighting in a loose coalition on the side of Khmer Rouge, the powerful Communist rebel group, against Prime Minister Hun Sen’s faction.'
'Although the aid, described as nonlethal, is small compared with the support that China and Singapore give to the guerrillas, critics say that United States policy could help bring Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge back to power. Human rights monitors charge that more than a million people died under Khmer Rouge rule in the 1970’s, during a radical restructuring throughout the nation. The Administration continues to argue that the present policy is the best way to shore up the non-Communist guerrillas and to restrain an expansionist Vietnam, which helped install the present ruling faction in Phnom Penh in 1979. The Administration backs a proposal of Australia and Representative Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat of Brooklyn, that the United Nations would help administer Cambodia after a cease-fire until democratic elections.'
'United States policy goes back to the late 1970’s, when the Carter Administration, hoping to improve relations with Beijing, put aside its human rights concerns and condoned China’s support of the Khmer Rouge. By 1982, Washington had helped persuade the non-Communist forces, whose most prominent leader is Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to join with the Khmer Rouge to drive Vietnam and the Hun Sen faction out of Cambodia. There was little debate on the issue for years, as worries over Vietnamese expansionism outweighed concern about the Khmer Rouge’s returning to power. But that is changing as a growing number in Congress fear a Khmer Rouge victory and wonder why the United States needs to involve itself in a struggle of limited strategic importance', bolstered by Vietnam’s withdrawl 'last year'.
Amidst a 'waning of the cold war', 'Administration officials say that the Vietnamese continue to deploy elite forces and advisers in Cambodia. But they concede that the Soviet Union has cut back its support for Vietnam and Cambodia and that Moscow will probably continue to do so.' Current policy isn’t 'going well', evidenced by KR battlefield wins and negotiation stalling. 'Moreover, a secret vote by the Senate Intelligence Committee to cut an estimated $10 million in aid to the insurgency late last month was a sign of growing opposition. The House approved more than $7 million in overt aid two weeks ago, but the Senate Democratic leadership has pledged to cut it.'
'"I’m troubled by the reports I’m getting that some of our aid is winding up in the hands of the Khmer Rouge and I can’t support anything that would allow that to happen," said Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, chairman of the subcommittee that will soon handle the legislation. "We are on the defensive," said a Congressional aide who supports the official Administration position. With a push from middle-level State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials here and in Thailand, the Administration is beginning to consider adjustments.'
'A senior State Department official said that he had asked his aides "to take a hard look" at a statement on June 11 by Senator George J. Mitchell, the Maine Democrat, in which the majority leader suggested that the United States open talks with the Hun Sen faction and ease restrictions on development and humanitarian aid to Cambodia. The Bush Administration has argued that Prime Minister Hun Sen is illegitimate because his Government remains dependent on Vietnamese support. In his statement, Senator Mitchell said: "The Administration’s Cambodia policy is incredible. It is insupportable. It must be changed." Senator Mitchell also advised that the United States withdraw its support for Khmer Rouge participation in the delegation that occupies Cambodia’s seat in the United Nations. Mr. Mitchell also suggested that steps be taken to "divorce" the non-Communist factions from the Khmer Rouge. A State Department official said the Administration might decide to go a step further than Mr. Mitchell’s proposal by encouraging the Sihanouk forces to join with the Hun Sen faction against the Khmer Rouge.'
Wariness of Offending China
'But he said such a policy would have to be pursued quietly. Otherwise, the Chinese might be emboldened to step up their support for the Khmer Rouge. The official stressed that such options had not yet reached the policy-making level of the Administration.' 'Proponents and opponents of the Administration position say the turning point for the policy could come if the five permanent members of United Nations Security Council, scheduled to meet in Paris this month, failed to work out a framework for an interim government and elections. Whatever the American policy, it may be difficult to stop the Khmer Rouge. The Hun Sen faction has had limited success in combating the well-disciplined guerrillas. "It is pretty late," said Nayan Chanda, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "But the only thing that could prevent the Khmer Rouge from taking power is a united approach by the Western industrial nations and Asean to urge Prince Sihanouk to form a coalition with the Hun Sen regime."'
1990_7_08 (Charlotte Libov | P74/?? | Sunday 1990/7/8): Dance Keeps Cambodian Culture Alive - A new troupe emerges from the dreams of a refugee who lives in the state. TO READ
1990_7_13 (Clifford Krauss in Washington DC | P03 | Saturday 1990/7/14): U.S. Policy on Cambodia Shifts a Bit - A welcome offer to identify G.I.’s lost in Vietnam. 'In a break from past policy of shunning the Cambodian Government, the Bush Administration announced today that it had accepted an offer by Phnom Penh to cooperate in examining what could be the remains of Americans missing in action from the Vietnam War. The State Department announcement comes at a time when the Bush Administration is reviewing its policy of aiding a rebel insurgency fighting the Vietnamese-backed Government of Prime Minister Hun Sen. Washington is currently sending more than $15 million a year in covert and overt aid to two small non-Communist guerrilla organizations fighting in a loose coalition with the Communist Khmer Rouge against the Government.'
'The policy review has been pushed by rising concern in Congress that the Bush Administration could inadvertently help the Khmer Rouge retake power. In the 1970’s, the Khmer Rouge radically restructured Cambodian society, clearing the cities of intellectuals and professionals and breaking up families. More than a million people died under their rule.'
The efforts 'gained ground last February' in talks between US Senator Charles S. Robb and Hun Sen. 'A senior State Department official said the Administration is treating the agreement to cooperate "as a humanitarian process." But the official, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, added that there "would be some prospect of dealing with Hun Sen" politically if the Cambodian leader showed greater flexibility in regional peace talks.'
Democratic Elections the Goal
'The Bush Administration hopes the talks will organize an interim government to rule until democratic elections can be held under international supervision. Such an interim government would either be administered by the United Nations or by a coalition consisting of the three guerrilla groups and the current Government. The announcement appeared to ease the rising tension between Congress and the Administration on the Cambodia issue. Rep. Chester Atkins, Democrat of Massachusetts, said, "I am just delighted they are sending over this team." Mr. Atkins, who is a leading critic of the Administration’s Cambodia policy, said he hoped the new cooperation between Washington and Phnom Penh would "create a better environment for relations between our two countries."' Speaking 'at the annual meeting of the National League of POW/MIA Families', 'called on Vietnam to step up its efforts to account for American soldiers missing since the war', '"and lay the groundwork for improved relations with the context of a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia." He characterized his speech as "an important message, a message Hanoi should understand" so that the two nations "can move forward together toward a day when relations can be normal."'
1990_7_18 (Clifford Krauss in Washington DC | P10 | Thursday 1990/7/19): Behind U.S. Reversal: Gains by the Khmer Rouge - Using a strategy that brought the rebels to power. 'Defense and intelligence officials say they are increasingly concerned that the Communist Khmer Rouge guerrillas are winning their war to oust the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian Government. The Bush Administration’s announcement today that it is withdrawing recognition of the Cambodian rebel coalition and opening talks with Vietnam underlines that concern.' Though the USSD doesn’t think 'the Cambodian Government will fall this year. They said that two non-Communist guerrilla groups loosely allied with the Khmer Rouge had failed to make similar advances. The two groups receive more than $15 million in yearly overt and covert American assistance. "A primary concern of our policy is to keep the Khmer Rouge from taking power," said a senior State Department official. "Khmer Rouge military advances have caused concern."'
'Human-rights monitors have documented that more than a million Cambodians were killed under Khmer Rouge rule in the 1970’s during a radical restructuring of society that included the forced mass migration of urban people into the countryside. Administration officials said that the Khmer Rouge rebels are following rural-based strategy similar to the one used in encircling Phnom Penh in 1975, when the Khmer Rouge came to power.' In the KR rainy-season offensive, 'on northern, southern and central villages within 40 miles of the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, Government forces are retreating and in some cases dropping their weapons, the officials said.'
'A Defense Department official said the Khmer Rouge strategy was directed at "undermining the people’s confidence in the Government and the Government’s confidence in itself." The official continued: "The Government forces are hard pressed and extended in contending with the Khmer Rouge offensive. Morale problems and corruption are clearly evident."' Meanwhile, other issues: 'The Government cannot pay all of its civil servants and soldiers, a situation made all the more severe by rising inflation and a decline in Vietnamese and Soviet economic aid.' Also mention of Vietnamese withdrawl, but 'a few thousand Vietnamese military advisers have returned to help beat back the offensive.' The CIA estimates Chinese aid to the KR 'approaches $100 million a year, while the non-Communist groups receive much less from several countries, including Singapore, which sends them $10 million a year in military hardware and other supplies. The C.I.A. estimates that the Khmer Rouge is backed in one form or another by 30 percent of the population, with larger proportions of support in areas they control, where they can exercise intimidation.'
'C.I.A. analysts also said the non-Communist groups and Khmer Rouge share supply lines, raising questions of how the Bush Administration can continue to supply the non-Communists without inadvertently helping the Khmer Rouge. The deeper the American-supported groups operate inside Cambodia, the more dependent they are on the Khmer Rouge.'
1990_7_19 ([Editorial Staff?] | P10 | Thursday 1990/7/19): The Cambodian Ordeal: A Country Bleeds for 15 Years. This timeline starts on April 1975 (when the 'Communist guerrillas of the Khmer Rouge seize the capital, Phnom Penh, defeating the non-Communist Government of Marshal Lon Nol'), not in 1969, when the US started bombing. 'Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge impose a brutal reorganization of society in which more than a million people die. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, their virtual prisoner, is named head of state.'
Next, Vietnam invades, 'driving the Khmer Rouge to the Thai border', and 'install[s] a new Government led by Heng Samrin'. Next, 'The Khmer Rouge, the largest of three guerrilla groups fighting the Vietnamese-installed Government, is recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate government of Cambodia.' In June 1982, 'Under pressure from China, the United States and other backers, the three Cambodian guerrilla factions form a coalition government in exile with Prince Sihanouk as president, Khieu Samphan of the Khmer Rouge as vice president and Son Sann of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front as prime minister. Despite its opposition to the Khmer Rouge, the United States recognizes the rebel coalition.' In May 1987, 'Prince Sihanouk steps down for a year as head of the coalition after attacks on his men by Khmer Rouge and pursues his own peace initiative.' In Feb 1988, 'Under Chinese pressure, Prince Sihanouk returns to lead the coalition.' An overview of Vietnam’s withdrawl process, and some UN and Paris meetings. June 1990: 'The Senate majority leader, George J. Mitchell of Maine, suggests that the United States open talks with the Hun Sen Government and ease restrictions on development and humanitarian aid to Cambodia.' July 1990: 'Under pressure from Congress and in light of battlefield gains by the Khmer Rouge, the Bush Administration withdraws its recognition of the rebel coalition. A State Department official says the Administration might encourage the Sihanouk forces to join with the Phnom Penh Government against the Khmer Rouge.'
Query at: May 9 1993